University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

2016

Evolving Contours of Immigration Federalism: The
Case of Migrant Children
Elizabeth Keyes
University of Baltimore School of Law, ekeyes@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Keyes, Evolving Contours of Immigration Federalism: The Case of Migrant Children, 19 Harvard Latino Law Review 33 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac/338

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

EVOLVING CONTOURS OF IMMIGRATION
FEDERALISM: THE CASE OF
MIGRANT CHILDREN
Elizabeth Keyes'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................
I. THE EVOLVING STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP IN

SJS .....
A. A Brief Overview of Federal Immigration Gatekeeping
and its Variations................................
a. The Norm in Immigration Gatekeeping ............
b. State Gatekeeping in Variations ...................
c. The SIJS Variation ...............................
B. The State Role in SIJS 1990-1997 ....................
a. The Original Statute Giving Power to the States ...
b. Federal Contestation of the New State Gatekeeping
R ole ............................................
c. Plenary Power Pains .............................
C. 1997-2008: Amendments Asserting the Power of the
Federal Government .................................
a. The Era of Consent ..............................
b. Diffusion of Roles at the Federal Level ...........
D. Federal Role in Decline: 2008 Through the Present....
a. The Wilberforce Amendments ....................
b. Homeland Security's Continuing Difficulty
Accepting the New Balance of Power .............

II.

CHANGING ROLES, CHANGING JUSTIFICATIONS ..............

A.

Institutional Competence .............................
a. Then: State Court Expertise with No Federal
Equivalent ......................................
b. Now: Concurrent Competence ....................

34
40
40
40
41
43
45
45
47
50
51
51
55
56
56
57
58

59
59
62

Elizabeth Keyes, Assistant Professor, Director of the Immigrant Rights Clinic, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, M.P.A. Princeton
University, B.A. Carleton College. Professor Keyes frequently represents immigrant youth and
has been active on the issue of finding representation for immigrant minors in Maryland. I
thank Daria Fisher Page, Theo Liebmann, Mariela Olivares, Jayesh Rathod and Sarah Rogerson for useful comments on this article as it evolved, and the participants at the 2015 Clinical
Law Review Workshop at New York University, the 2015 Emerging Immigration Professors
Workshop at the University of Miami, and Barbara Babb and the University of Baltimore
Faculty Research and Development Committee. Any mistakes are my own. The article is dedicated to my two youngest clients, ages 5 and 6 when we began working together, and their
extraordinary grandmother who has been lovingly helping them navigate these complex
systems.

Harvard Latino Law Review

B.

III. A

Vol. 19

i. State Court Competence Today ...............
ii. Federal Competence Today: HHS and DHS ...
Conflict-of-Interest...................................
a. Then: Jailer and Caregiver ........................
b. Now: Attenuated Conflicts .......................

63
65
70
70
71

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM WITH SIGNIFICANT PRACTICAL

COSTS ..................................................
A. Geographic DisparitiesMean a Federal Statute is Not
Truly Federal........................................
a. Geographically Disparate Results .................
b. Thought-Experiment: SIJS as an Experiment in
State-Level Involvement in Granting Immigration
S tatus ...........................................
B. Adversarial Versus Non-Adversarial Proceedings ......
C. The Catch-22 of Using State Court Primarilyfor SIJS
Purposes ............................................
D. Access to Justice ....................................
a. Limited Access to Justice ........................
b. The Cautionary Tale of Maryland: Trying Hard and
Still Struggling to Meet the Need .................
CONCLUSION: TIME TO CONSIDER

FULLY

73
73
74

76
77
80
81
81
84

RESTORING THE FEDERAL

R OLE ...................................................

85

INTRODUCTION

The immigration lawyer settled in to work that morning, and reviewed
the petition a client was filing for her spouse to get a green card. It looked
good-she assembled all the evidence that the couple lived together, added
copies of their joint bank account statements, moved the birth certificate of
their new baby to the top of the filing, and threw in a few photos of their
wedding for good measure. She sent it off to United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, the office within the Department of Homeland Security with the authority to decide whether her client's marriage-a marriage
that happened in state court-was a "good faith marriage" or not, and to
grant or reject the petition as a matter of federal law. She talked with her
summer law clerk for a few minutes about the kind of evidence they could
get to prove another client was a victim of domestic violence. The district
court judge had refused to enter a protective order in the case since the vase
that her boyfriend threw hit the wall and shattered, instead of hitting her as
intended. Fortunately, that client had pictures, photos of threatening text
messages, and a strong letter from her counselor, all of which would be
admissible evidence in the immigration application. She knew it was not an
open-and-shut case, but she felt hopeful that it would be enough to succeed.
Then, with a sigh, the lawyer turned to her 8-year-old Honduran client,
whose father had recently died, and whose mother was in jail in Honduras.
The child qualified for a "special immigrant juvenile" immigration visa be-
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cause she had been abandoned, but the lawyer could not just send the abandonment evidence in to the Department of Homeland Security, as she had
for the other applications this morning. She had to first engage with the state
court system, working with her client's 20-year-old brother, who was willing
to be a guardian for the child. Unfortunately, in this state, guardianship could
only happen after parental rights had been terminated-something that made
her state different from almost any other state. 2 Now, the lawyer was going
to devote much of her morning to figuring out termination of parental rights
with an imprisoned mother in a foreign country whose legal system was
entirely unfamiliar to her.
None of her other cases were particularly easy, but their exclusively
federal nature provided her with the chance to develop true expertise in dealing with federal adjudications. This one was a stretch. Not for the first time,
the lawyer wished she could just send her evidence off to immigration authorities, whom she was sure would interpret these facts as constituting
abandonment, instead of going through what felt like increasingly unfair,
inefficient, and unnecessary state court procedures. She pulled up the procedural rules for juvenile court and began.
Unprecedented numbers of unaccompanied children traveled to the
United States seeking safety from increased gang violence in Central
America.3 The children quickly encountered a legal system of staggering
complexity, with all too few lawyers trained and available to help them navigate through it. Although the children's situation faded from headlines after
the summer of 2014, children continue to arrive, and the difficult work of
providing legal representation has intensified.
The scale of the problem has revealed an unnecessary unwieldiness in
the humanitarian protection available to these, and other, vulnerable children. Many of the children have asylum claims, the legal complexities of
which make legal representation vital. The asylum process, while difficult on
emotional and legal levels, at least benefits from a relatively clear process,
contained entirely within the boundaries of the traditional structures implementing immigration law: the Department of Homeland Security and the
immigration courts within the Department of Justice. In its clarity and consolidation of adjudications, it contrasts sharply with the other humanitarian
protection available to vulnerable children: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS).
Immigration law has never known anything quite like Special Inmigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS). Operating as a form of humanitarian protection
in the law since 1990, 4 SIJS relies heavily upon state court judges who must
2 In Maryland, for example, a third party cannot be appointed guardian when a living
parent's parental rights have not been terminated. In re Guardianshipof Zealand W., 102 A.3d
837 (Md. 2014).
3 SIJS is not limited to Central American children, and children from many regions of the
world have benefited from it. It first caught popular attention, though, because of the concentration of new arrivals potentially eligible for the benefit.
' See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J) (2014).
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issue a set of findings based on state law related to the child. This makes it
unlike almost any other application for immigration status. Through guardianship, custody, dependency or similar proceedings, children with SIUS eligibility must obtain special findings that, among other things, they had been
abused, abandoned, neglected, or similarly harmed. The court must also find
that it would not be in their best interests to be returned to their home country. The children are then eligible to apply to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) for lawful and enduring immigration status: lawful permanent residence.'
The work of representing vulnerable children in immigration proceedings required a large number of pro bono lawyers to become overnight experts in the intersection of two highly-specialized areas of the law:
immigration removal defense, and child custody, guardianship and dependency proceedings. 6 Immigration litigation is always difficult,7 but the children's cases raise a host of special challenges: not only are these minors with
varying degrees of capacity and legal competence, but a sizable portion have
suffered terrible traumas that may make it hard to build a case. 8 Many, no
doubt, also have a limited understanding of the multiple legal systems in
which their cases are moving forward. At any given time, a child may be in
the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement, appearing before a Department of Justice immigration
court, appearing in a state court case, and have asylum applications pending
before the Department of Homeland Security's United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services.
The complexity for the children is one concern of this article, but the
complexity for their attorneys deserves consideration as well. Difficult cases
crossing multiple areas of law limits the availability of lawyers willing and
able to represent these children. While some children reunite with family
members who can pay for representation, the world of private attorneys with
expertise in both immigration court and state court rules, procedures and
laws is limited. For the many, many children who cannot afford representation, the pool of non-profit and pro bono attorneys trained and able to take
on more than a handful of cases is lamentably low.9 Driven by this shortage,
' If this paragraph seems confusing to a reader of a law review article, consider how
confusing it might be to a child who speaks little or no English and who has experienced
severe trauma both in the home country and along the way to the United States.
6 Many lawyers also needed to develop expertise in asylum law, but this article will be
focusing on the specific issue of SIJS.
' See Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the
Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 551-564 (2011) (naming harshness,
complexity, and opacity as contributing to the tremendous overburdening of the immigration
court system).
I See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN ON T-HE RUN (2014), available at
http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/-UAC-Children%2Oon%20the%20RunFull%20Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UYE8-N2H5.
9 See Elizabeth Keyes, Opinion, Protecting and Serving U.S. Immigrants, BALT. SUN
(Nov. 24, 2014), availableat http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/opedlbs-ed-notarios20141124-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3FRA-CFYA.
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and the depth of the access-to-justice crisis facing a vulnerable population,
this article asks the question: Is all this complexity is necessary? The answer
is, emphatically, no.
Existing literature takes the bifurcated state-federal structure as given,
and seeks to make important improvements from within that framework. 0
This article questions the framework itself. First, in Part I, the article looks at
adaptations to the bifurcated structure over time, showing a tug-of-war between federal and state authority over the course of the statute's 25-year
history. The shifting power balance reflects an uneasy relationship at the
heart of SIJS, with state courts playing an uncharacteristic gatekeeping role
for implementation of a federal law. While one political branch of government, Congress, created this structure, the Executive branch has contested
the power-sharing almost since the law's inception. The article contends that
the present-day reassertion of federal oversight of state court decisions is a
natural result of the federal government's uneasiness with the state court's
pivotal role in this process. All of these shifts occurred without accompanying analysis of whether the allocation of authority helps achieve the law's
objectives.
By grounding the article's subsequent analysis in this rich and shifting
historical context, the article does two things. First, it builds our historical
understanding of the law, which for many current practitioners is only 'understood in its most recent post-2008 incarnation. Second, and more importantly, it suggests that there are profound and enduring structural reasons for
the tension between states and the federal government over the shared responsibility to implement this aspect of immigration law. Even in the current iteration that generally favors the state role, the federal government
continues to question and look behind state court rulings. The consistently
uncomfortable federal-state relationship has led to a more active federal
oversight role. This new role duplicates and undermines the state's role, calling into question the rationale for even having a state role in the first place.
Why then in 1990 did Congress delegate this particular gatekeeping
role to the States? The article considers two preeminent rationales. First,
state courts were the only institution with competence, both substantive and
procedural, to make "best interests of the child" determinations. State courts
made such findings routinely in a variety of family and dependency-related
causes of action, providing substantive competence. And foster care-eligible
10

See generally Laila Hass, States and Status: A Study of Geographical Disparitiesfor

Immigrant Youth, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 266 (2014); Jessica R. Pulitzer, Fear and
Failing in State court: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and the State Court Problem, 21
CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 201, 217 (2014); Randi Mandelbaum & Elissa Steglich, Disparate
Outcomes: The Quest for Uniform Treatment of Immigrant Children, 50 FAM. Cr. RFv. 606
(2012); Aryah Somers, Pedro Herrera & Lucia Rodriguez, Constructions of Childhood and
Unaccompanied Children in the Immigration System in the United States, 14 U.C. DAVIS J.
Juv. L. & POL'Y 311 (2010); David Thronson, Thinking Small: The Need for Big Changes in
Immigration Law's Treatment of Children, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 239 (2010);
David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEx. Hisp. J. L. & POL'Y 45 (2005).
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migrant children were typically already before state courts in various forms
of dependency proceedings, providing procedural convenience. Second, the
delegation of authority to those courts helped avoid a massive conflict of
interest within the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service which had
responsibility for the custody and wellbeing of the minors, while simultaneously being responsible for seeking their removal.
These justifications have changed and diminished in the intervening
years. What was true in 1990 is not true today. In Part II, the article contrasts
the strength of the justifications in 1990 to their strength today, and finds
two things. First, state courts are no longer the only institutional actors with
the competence to adjudicate a child's best interests. Second, institutional
changes in the federal government have removed the conflict-of-interest
justification.
Meanwhile, new problems have clearly emerged with the current structure. Part HI explores four of these problems. First is the issue of disparate
geographic access to SIJS, with dramatically uneven access to relief across
thousands of jurisdictions.11 State laws and procedures vary across the states,
judicial attitudes vary even across courtrooms, and levels of available representation to navigate the processes likewise vary. The laws and systems operate smoothly in certain locations within the United States, but poorly--or
not at all-in others. Such uneven implementation destroys the integrity of a
nominally federal law.
Second, the current process requires children to engage in an adversarial process that is not particularly designed to meet their needs. There is
no special cause of action that SIJS-eligible children can pursue in state
court. Rather, they need to engage the state court system within some existing cause of action, like custody, guardianship, and dependency proceedings. In other areas of immigration law, children write application-specific
affidavits for written applications, or go to non-adversarial asylum interviews with officers specifically trained to hear asylum cases. They do not
need to invoke an opposing party or testify in court to have their claim
considered.
Third, children face a "catch-22" within this system. Interpretive guidance requires that the children not be in court just to become eligible for
SIJS, but rather must be in court for another reason. A child who was abandoned by one parent as a baby and who is now living safely with the other
parent in the United States, might have almost no other reason to go into
state court. Using the state court system is a sine qua non for the SIJS process, but the process does not permit access to the court only to advance a
SIJS claim.
" See Hlass, supra note 10; Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 10. As will be discussed
in Part Ill(A), Professor Hass's research both ties into the descriptive understanding of the
problems of state court adjudications, and documents one aspect of the federalism problems in
the current system. Professor Hass focuses on state-to-state differences, but there are also
significant intra-state differences, from courthouse to courthouse. See also Pulitzer, supra note
10.
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Finally, the needs of the children have created a crisis with access to
justice. Potential SIJS petitioners need lawyers well versed in both immigration and family law, and those same lawyers and advocates need to educate
judges county-by-county, and state-by-state, on the intricacies of immigration law. Despite dramatic, rapid expansions in the corps of attorneys staffing SIJS cases at free or low-cost legal services organizations, the needs
nonetheless dramatically outstrip the available resources. The article draws
on the specific experience of Maryland, a top destination for the recent and
ongoing influx of Central American children, to illustrate this access to justice issue.
It is time to question the very model of relying upon state court determinations for all children seeking SIJS. Access to justice continues to grow
worse for thousands of young people seeking safety in the United States,
with children continuing to arrive since the 2014 crisis brought the issue into
focus. The existing law is not designed to be effective for its current purposes. SIJS serves a population largely unable to pay for private representation. The system is so complicated with so many moving parts that many
with viable claims will never have those claims heard. This leaves critical
protections out of reach for the most vulnerable.
There are some identifiable positives to involving states more in immigration law's implementation. But where states are inclined to act favorably
for immigrants needing protection, the article asserts that the state role is
highly problematic in its unevenness, its complexity, and its distance from
the federal immigration adjudication process. As Juliet Stumpf has written,
in the context of criminal, labor, and welfare delegations of federal authority, "Subnational action may enhance federal enforcement of immigration
law, but it may also usurp federal control over foreign policy and national
membership and undermine individual protections for noncitizens." 12 Here,
subnational action may enhance federal benefits for some prospective immigrants, but may also undermine protections for many others. SIJS is a part of
our web of protection. Designating states as custodians of the gates to protection is out of step with the role SIJS now plays in addressing the crisis of
child migration.
The article concludes that the extent of problems presented by state
courts requires us to go back to fundamentals and challenge the state's involvement in this federal immigration law. Incremental change is vital, particularly given the gridlock surrounding federal immigration reform.
Improving the law as we have it today means devising a system that will
work for all involved. The article puts forward a definitive solution: a legislative change giving exclusive authority to the federal government through a
centralized adjudications unit. Such centralization could better achieve the
law's objectives than the current system, as demonstrated by decades of federal adjudications over other protective and humanitarian parts of the immi2

Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confitsion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigra-

tion, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1557, 1564 (2008).
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gration law. While several solutions are feasible, this Article aims to build
consensus over the deeper structural problem underlying this form of humanitarian protection. Now is the time to reimagine a system dedicated to
providing relief to the children greatly in need of the security and protection
promised by the law.
I.

THE EvOLVING STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP IN SIJS

The relationship resulting from a bifurcated, state-federal process for

SIJS has been neither easy nor stable. Since its inception in 1990, there have
been three major iterations of SIJS. Each stage shows the law grappling with
thc question of an appropiate balaunce betweeni state ad fedeal loles. Thfis
section shows how the birth of the state role in 1990 prompted the federal
immigration agency to seek ways of increasing its oversight and gatekeeping
functions. This led to amendments in 1997 that restored some of these fumctions to the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service. But after this period of federal reclamation of power, the 2008 amendments tipped the
balance back much more toward the states. This shift has led to the present
uneasy relationship
A.

A Brief Overview of Federal Immigration Gatekeeping
and its Variations

Before turning to the specifics of those changes, it is useful to point out
the mechanics of the federal government's typical and atypical processes.
This power is one of gatekeeping. the authority to determine who may ente
the United States physically and legally, and who may stay."3
a.

The Norm in Immigration Gatekeeping

Although the states had a role in immigration gatekeeping until the late
19th century, 4 the federal government's exclusive role has been the normand largely the law-ever since the 1880s. In a series of landmark cases
establishing the plenary power doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the
power to regulate admissions" and deportations 6 was exclusively federal.
The Court, in turn, had to apply enormous constitutional deference to the
political branches of the federal government. The Court relied upon the pre"3The term "gatekeeping" has been used in immigration law for generations, and was
recently thoughtfully explored by Professor Motomura. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion
that 41attes: FederalImmigration Enforcement, State and Local .Arrests, and the Civil Crimi

nal Line, 58 UCLA L. RFv. 1819 (2011).
4 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage,91 MINN.
L. Rev. 1625, 1646 (2007); Elizabeth Keyes, Race and Immigration, Then and Now: How the
Shift to "Wo, thintess" Uudeniines the 1965 hlmipaltion Law's Civil Righs Goals, 57 Huw. L.
J. 899, 902-905 (2014).
'5 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
6
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-714 (1893).
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emption doctrine to strike down state laws interfering with federal admission
and deportation decisions. 7
The practical import of this norm is that to seek admission to the United
States, prospective immigrants engage exclusively with the federal government-the Department of State overseas, and the Department of Homeland
Security within the United States and at its borders. For one, the Department
of State screens prospective tourists for everything from criminal history, to
their "nonimmigrant intent," to the existence of qualified educational programs necessary for student visas. All such screening is governed by the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and is detailed for officers in the Foreign
Affairs Manual. At and within U.S. borders, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) does this screening with comparable complexities. DHS reviews petitions that citizens and permanent residents file for their spouses,
determines whether those are bona fide marriages, and whether the intending-immigrants meet the same range of admissibility criteria. An even
more complex series of adjudications happens with many employment visas.
For example, multiple agencies are involved in verifying a job offer, establishing that no American worker could be found for the position, and.then
screening the prospective employee for all the same inadmissibility issues
for which the spouse in the example above was screened. Complex issues,
yes, and addressed entirely at the federal level.
b.

State Gatekeeping Variations

Since the mid-1980s, this federal gatekeeping norm has eroded in notable ways. Stephen Lee, Hiroshi Motomura and others have examined this
phenomenon in the criminal context." With the expansion of criminal
grounds of inadmissibility in 1996, state criminal courts took on a primary
role by initiating a process by which immigrants could ultimately be removed from the United States. Juliet Stumpf has also considered this phenomenon in the employment context, noting that the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 put local employers in a gatekeeping role because
the requirement of checking immigration status of employees virtually made
them private enforcers of immigration law.19 Kerry Abrams and others have
explored how immigration law "regulates" families, as well as how family
law influences federal approaches. 20 These scholars' interest in the ill-defined
"vAlthough it is only one case in a long line of decisions considering the limits of the
preemption doctrine as applied to immigration law, for an excellent history of this jurisprudence, see Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012).
8 See, e.g., Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CAL. L. REV. 553 (2013);
Motomura, supra note 13.
19See Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares About E Verify (and Why
They Should), 2 UC IRVINE L. REv. 381, 394-95 (2012) ("IRCA imbued the employer with the
gatekeeping role of screening new hires, a function previously reserved to immigration enforcement officials."); see also Stumpf, supra note 12 (considering the federal role in three
areas of traditional state responsibility: crime, employment, and welfare).
21 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 14.
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borders between immigration law and other, non-federal, areas of the law are
undoubtedly persuasive. SIJS marks the most extreme and explicit breakdown yet of the proverbial "line" between federal and state jurisdiction.
The variation closest to SIJS is a visa for victims of crime, the U visa.
U visa applicants must obtain a certification from law enforcement as to the
nature of the crime, as well as evidence of the victim's willingness to cooperate with an investigation or prosecution.21 This certification can be obtained22
from any law enforcement agency, including federal law enforcement.
Some scholars have criticized the certification requirement for both requiring victims to become accusers 23 and for placing relief in the hands of law
enforcement, not immigration authorities. 24 The otherwise comparable visa
for trafficking survivors asks for certification, but only for situations where
the applicant could not get the certification. Current regulations allow applicants to submit evidence demonstrating their efforts to at least try to obtain
the certification. This mechanism thus keeps a significant federal role in the
2
adjudication process. s
Family law presents one of the most interesting, and apt, variations to
consider in assessing the validity of the state's role. Federal immigration law
defers to state (and foreign) regulations for marriage by recognizing marriages that are "valid where performed." A 15-year-old in Arizona, for example, can marry with parental consent and a court order and file for her
spouse's permanent residence; a 15-year-old in the District of Columbia, on
the other hand, cannot. Likewise, a marriage meeting the requirements for a
common law marriage in the District of Columbia 26 is valid for immigration
purposes, but a similarly situated couple in Minnesota could not petition for
a visa under Minnesota common law. Federal law tolerates such state variations, thus giving states a significant role in immigration gatekeeping. In her
investigation of how the federal immigration law implicitly regulates marriage, Kerry Abrams notes the unusual tension between the "atypically
broad power" Congress has to regulate immigration and its powerlessness in
the family law realm. "[F]amily law-the law that says who may marry,
what spousal obligations exist, and sets the terms for divorce-is one area
21See 8 C.F.R. 214.14(c)(2)(i) (2013).
22 This

federal level certification option is one aspect that distinguishes the U visa process

slightly from the SIJS predicate-order requirement, whose requisite findings can only be made
at the state level.
23 See generally Michael Kagan, Immigrant Victims, Immigrant Accusers, 48 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 915 (2015).
24 See Tahja L. Jensen, U Visa "Certification":Overcoming the Local Hurdle in Response
to A Federal Statute, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 691, 693 (2009).
25 For a comparison of the two provisions, see generally Leslye E. Orloff et. al.,
Mandatory U- Visa Certification Unnecessarily Undenines the Puiposc of the Viulence
Against Women Act's Immigration Protections and Its "Any Credible Evidence" Rules-A Call
for Consistency, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 619 (2010). For a proposal to alter the U visa
process, see generally Kagan, supra note 23.
26 See, e.g., Thomas v. Murphy, 107 F.2d 268, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (requiring an intent to
be married, holding themselves out as married, and residing together for a significant period of
time).
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that is clearly beyond any of Congress's enumerated powers and lies, rather,
within the powers traditionally granted to the states."2 As discussed below,
variations only grow sharper in the SIJS process.
c.

The SIJS Variation

The political branches of the federal government have specifically delegated to the states a piece of their plenary power to admit immigrants for one
very specific sub-group: immigrant juveniles. This delegation happens in
ways more explicit and intentional than any of the variations touched on
above.
The SIJS process requires two steps within the immigration bureaucracy, the petition stage and the application for permanent residence ("green
card") stage. The process is even more complex if the child is in custody.
The petition stage requires the petitioning child to acquire the requisite state
court findings (the "predicate order") before the petition can be filed. The
permanent residence application stage meanwhile requires a much more
thorough vetting of the child's admissibility like that for any green card applicant (as discussed below, SJS applicants still have some exceptions and
waivers available to them that are not available to other green card applicants). Altogether, this is what I term the SIUS "two-step." The remainder of
this section looks at those areas where the state role diverges from the steps
typical of other aspects of the immigration process.
The first step, the petition stage, nearly resembles the family law variations noted above. The predicate order is somewhat analogous, for example,
to the marriage license that a U.S. citizen must provide for the spouse's immigration petition to be approved.2" However, immigration status is not relevant to the ability to marry, and the citizen spouse and immigrant spouse do
not need to make any reference to immigration status to get married. If they
are eligible under state law to marry, they can marry, and the marriage registrar makes no inquiry into the relevance of immigration laws or to conditions
in the immigrant spouse's country of origin. Indeed, there is no judicial determination at all. By contrast, immigration laws are highly relevant to the
issuance of a state-court predicate order for SIJS. The state court must base
the findings upon the requirements set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and as discussed more in Part I1 (A), infra, some states may
also take the custodian or guardian's immigration status into account in deciding the custody or guardianship itself. The INA also requires the state
court to consider conditions in the minor child's country of origin-creating
problems discussed in more detail in Part III, infra.
The basic outline of the SIJ process has not fundamentally changed
since its inception. It requires first a petition to immigration authorities
27 Abrams, supra note 14, at 1646.

8 See 8 C.F.R. 204.2(a)(2) (requiring "a certificate of marriage issued by civil authorities,
and proof of the legal termination of all previous marriages of both the petitioner and the
beneficiary").
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based upon the predicate order obtained from state court, and then an application for permanent residence once the petition is approved. However, the
requirements of the law have altered significantly over time in ways that
have vastly reshaped how the process proceeds. Table I provides tracks
these changes over time, for comparison and reference accompanying the
analysis below. Significant changes are underlined.
TABLE

1:

TRACING THE CHANGES IN

1990:
STATE-favored

SIJS

1997:
FEDERAL-favored

2008:
STATE-favored

Kind of
Minor
Permitted to
Apply

Declared dependent
in juvenile court.

Declared dependent
on juvenile court oQr
legally committed or
in custody of another
State department or
agency

All of the earlier
bases, and also
applies to minors
placed in custody or
guardianship of an
individual

Connection
to foster
care

Eligible long-term
foster care

None

Best
Interest
Standard

Not in his/her best
interest to be
returned to country
of nationality/ last
habitual residence
None (except
indirectly, insofar as
parental issues would
make minor eligible
for foster care)

Eligible for long-term
foster care due to
abuse, neglect. or
abandonment
Same

Foster care
appropriateness must
be due to abuse,
neglect, or
abandonment.

Reunification with
one or both parents
not viable due to
abuse, abandonment
or neglect, or other
similar basis found
under State law. 29

Relationship
to parents

Same

29 Federal law had, at this point, definitions of abuse and abandonment through the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (Nov. 19, 1997).
This "under state law" language in the 2008 amendment, however, clarified that if a state's
definition of abuse or abandonment was more restrictive than the federal one, the state one
would be applied. I thank Sarah Rogerson for this insight.
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STATE-favored

Exceptions

Parents forbidden to
benefit derivatively

45

1997:
FEDERAL-favored

2008:
STATE-favored

Parents forbidden to
benefit derivatively.
AND
Juvenile court has no
jurisdiction over
minors in "actual or
constructive custody
"of AttomeyGeneral, without the
specific consent ot
Attorney-General
AND
In any event,

Parents forbidden to
benefit derivatively
AND
HHS must
specifically consent
to jurisdiction over
minors in HHS
"custody" (language
about actual or
constructive
removed)3"

approval of the
dependence order as
basis for petition
requires express

consent of Attorney-

General

The remainder of Part I explores these changes and their impacts on statefederal power allocation.
B.
a.

The State Role in SIJS 1990-1997

The Original Statute Giving Power to the States

In 1990, Congress passed the first law providing a path to lawful permanent residence for. unaccompanied migrant children.3' The law arose out
of a specific context: the problem of lasting solutions for unaccompanied
minors in the custody of the then-INS, which at the time was under the
Department of Justice.32 Social workers for these children were frustrated by
the fate of their young migrant clients after the children aged out of the
foster care system. The children went from receiving support services and
care, to into removal proceedings if they had no legal immigration status.
The social workers knew deportation proceedings would force these children
back to countries where the children had experienced harm and would face

30 The following year, HHS clarified that specific consent is required only where a change
in federal custody is contemplated.
31Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978 5005-06 (1990)
(codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (West 2015)) [hereinafter 1990 SIJS Law].
32The Community Relations Service, also within Department of Justice, formerly had
custody of the children as well. See M. Aryah Somers et. al., Constructionsof Childhoodand

Unaccompanied Children in the Immigration System in the United States, 14 U.C.
Juv. L. & POL'Y 311, 334 (2010).

DAVIS
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inordinately difficult futures.33 Regulators, on the other hand, portrayed the
new law as a means of aiding minors who had been left out of the amnesty
provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Control Act of 1986, passed not
34
long before the 1990 enactment of SIJS.
The original SIUS statute eased this frustrating problem by offering minors the possibility of converting their tenuous status as wards of the INS
into permanent residence. Under the original 1990 version of the law, SIUS
was available to a minor who 1) "has been declared dependent on a juvenile
court located in the United States and has been deemed eligible by that court
for long-term foster care," and 2) "for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien's best
interest to be returned [to the country of origin]." 35 Thus, children who were
already before the court for dependency proceedings now had a means of
transitioning into a more stable, durable immigration status. Notably, the
state juvenile court judges were the initial gatekeepers for this transition to
permanent residence, equipped with the power to approve or deny a child's
petition to advance through the SIJS two-step.
The INS (also known as "the Service") emphasized in implementing
regulations that it had no intention of looking behind state-court adjudications about best interests. "The Service believes that it would be both impractical and inappropriate for the Service to routinely readjudicate judicial
or social service agency administrative determinations as to the juvenile's
best interest. 3 6 The sincerity of this belief was immediately tested, as seen
below. But at least at the outset, the intention was to make a system based on
a cooperative federal-state relationship.
The federal government-particularly the INS-retained a secondary
gatekeeping role at SIJS's second step. While the state court "best interest"
adjudication was almost always going to be sufficient to let the minor have a
valid immigration petition at the first step of the process, the petition had to
be followed by the actual application for permanent residence. At this stage
the government retained the power to screen out deportable (later, "inadmissible" minors) for a host of reasons, including criminal issues, poverty,
health problems, prior immigration violations, and so forth. The size of this
secondary gatekeeping role was quite small, however. Technical amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act enacted in 1991 permitted the
government to waive many of the issues that might have derailed this sec"3For a full discussion and analysis of the origins of the law, and the significance of its
various iterations, see generally Somers et. al., supra note 32.
31"Although many dependent alien juveniles were eligible for the legalization provisions
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), those benefits were only available for a limited period of time to certain aliens who had been in the United States since before
1982." Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile Court;
Revocation of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to Marriage Fraud
Amendments; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843-01, 42844 (Aug. 12, 1993) [hereinafter Special Immigrant Status rule].
31 1990 SIJS Law, supra note 31 § 153(a)(3).
36 Special Immigrant Status rule, supra note 34, at 42846.
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ond-step, creating an almost uniquely 7 generous space-relative to other
forms of immigration-for these unaccompanied minors.38 The federal government typically has a litany of grounds upon which to deny a would-be
immigrant admission to the United States. But the 1991 amendments eliminated a few fairly common grounds, including having made a misrepresentation to an immigration official, the likelihood of becoming a public charge,
public health issues, and several more.39 The amendments also permitted minors to seek SIJS if the juvenile court found that adoption or guardianship
were in their best interests. 40
Thus between the 1990 law and subsequent 1991 amendments, the core
responsibility for screening these minors for placement on a path to lawful
permanent residence happened in state-level courts, specifically juvenile
courts. Without the state court findings, the child could not proceed with
even the first step of the process. And the 1991 amendments emphasized the
critical nature of the state's gatekeeping role, since there were fewer reasons
available to the federal government to deny residence at the second step.
b.

Federal Contestation of the New State Gatekeeping Role

Although seen as a "cooperative state-federal system," 41 the then-INS
contested this power-sharing arrangement in numerous ways. Beginning in
the early 1990s, the INS challenged judicial assertions that state courts were
preempted from making these decisions, as well as patterns of bureaucratic
delays that prevented eligible children from benefiting from the SIJS process. Professor Adelson notes how these implementation problems undermined the goal of implementing a streamlined, rapid process between the
4
cooperative entities. 1
37VAWA is also a similarly expansive space-with the key difference, from the point of
view of this article, that the first-step of VAWA is a federal adjudication, thus the federal
government still has the monopoly on gatekeeping, even if the gates are relatively wider for
VAWA applicants. See infra Part II(A)(2).
38See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991,
Pub. L. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 § 302(d)(2). Interestingly from the perspective of a polarized
immigration political space in 2015, the regulations creating this more generous space justify
the amendments in terms of the children's need for lawful permanent residence. Indeed, the
original implementing rule called this a "technical" error, since Congress could not have intended to limit eligibility for the status: "Because many juveniles may be ineligible for adjustment of status because of these two provisions, the Service will seek a technical correction
from Congress." INS Implements Special Immigrant Statusfor Juveniles, Bona Fide Marriage

Appeal Process 68 No. 20

INTERPRErER RELEASES

635 (1991) (emphasis added). This is

sharply different than the modern norm of justifying laws in terms of the children's worthiness
of inclusion, their contributing potential, or America's need for the children. See generally
Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American, 14 NEv. L. J. 101 (2014).
"9See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2) (2014).
40 Special Immigrant Status rule, supra note 34, at 42850.
" Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien? The Contradictionsof Protecting Undocumented Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27 HASTTNGS CONST. L.Q.
597, 602 (2000).
42 See Wendi Adelson, The Case of the Eroding SIJS, 18 J. TRANSNAT'L LAW & POL'Y 65,
76-77 (2008).
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The first form of resistance emerged through the juvenile court system,
where the INS relied on arguments of federal preemption. The INS argued,
often successfully, that it retained custody broadly over children for whom it
either had physical or legal custody. As one Administrative Appeals Office
decision found, "Although physical custody has been delegated to social
services agencies who can better accommodate the special needs of
juveniles, juveniles in such foster care are still in the legal custody of the
43
Service.,
A Michigan District Court made a similar ruling in 1997, for a child in
the legal custody (in removal proceedings, but placed by INS in the physical
custody of a social services agency under contract with the federal government) of INS, noting the important dividing line between children who had
not been placed in removal proceedings and those who had." INS argued
that the predicate order was invalid because the Michigan probate court was
preempted from having jurisdiction in the matter. The Court noted,
If Plaintiff had not been previously arrested and taken into the custody of the INS, it appears that he would meet the special immigrant juvenile provisions. However, because Plaintiff was arrested,
detained, and in the legal custody of the INS at the time of the
probate court proceedings, the state probate court had no jurisdic45
tion over him.
The Court concluded by noting, "The federal immigration proceedings preempt the state court proceedings and the state court is without jurisdiction to
find the juvenile dependent,"' 4 and cited non-binding Minnesota decisions
(one published, one unpublished) that relied upon Hines v. Davidowit. 47 The
decision was ultimately reversed on appeal, 48 but shows the extent to which
state courts had to grapple with federal immigration law in these cases.
In another case where a child had been awarded the predicate order for
his SIJ case, the then-INS appealed, relying again upon preemption. After
noting how Congress had occupied the field and asserted exclusive custody
over "illegal [sic] immigrants," the Minnesota Court of Appeals held, "By
the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it can be inferred that
Congress did not intend to give courts jurisdiction over aliens in other circumstances and did intend to preclude state jurisdiction over illegal

" Petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4), 1997 WL 33170585, at *4, (emphasis added)
(citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 1430, 1445 (1993)).
44See Gao v. Jenifer, 991 F. Supp. 887, 890 (W.D. Mich. 1997) rev'd, 185 F.3d 548 (6th
Cir. 1999).
45Id. at 890.
46 Id.
47See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63, (1941) ("[Wihen the national government by treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges,
obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme law of the land.").
" See Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1999).
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aliens."' 9 Of most interest for this article is the concuring opinion: the judge

noted how this was "a pure political turf battle" with the INS, with Dakota
County Community Services arrayed on one side and the immigrant minor's
foster parents and the juvenile court on the other. 0
A second form of federal resistance to the 1990 law emerged through
bureaucratic opposition and delays. This pattern was first revealed through
the various stages of the Flores class-action litigation. There, children had
filed suit against a policy restricting the people to whom they could be released, creating what they alleged was a blanket detention policy that effectively limited their access to SIJS.51 The suit was ultimately resolved with
the 1996 Stipulated Flores Settlement, but multiple sources show how the
INS failed to effectively implement the agreement detailing the rights of
children in INS custody.52 In her 2002 U.S. Senate testimony, Wendy Young
of the Refugee Women's Commission stated that,
The Flores agreement requires the INS to release children to parents, relatives or other responsible entities or to otherwise place
them in the least restrictive setting possible. However, the INS
often fails to release children even when family is available. Service providers in Houston report that family reunification has
dropped from 75 to 35 percent.53
Gregory Chen recounts the story of "Gustavo Sanchez" (altered name), a
developmentally disabled Honduran boy who experienced vicious abuse at
the hands of his mother.5 4 The Los Angeles County child welfare system
removed Gustavo and placed him in foster care, and a state court found he
had been abused, neglected and abandoned-and fully eligible for SIJS.
Before he could obtain the status, the INS took custody of Gustavo for the
purposes of deporting him, and refused to return Gustavo to foster care even
after a federal judge ordered them to do so in 1998. Aryah Somers details the

" In re Welfare of Y.W., a/k/a J.W., 1996 WL 665937, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19,
1996) (unpublished decision).
50
d. at *5.
51 Of interest to those contesting the Obama Administration's policy of detaining mothers
and children starting in 2014, this policy, too, was the response to "dramatic increase in the
number of juvenile aliens" found unaccompanied by a parent, guardian or a[n] adult rolative.
Detention and Retention of Juveniles, 53 Fed.Reg. 17,449 (May 17, 1988); cf Julia Preston,
Judge Orders Stop to Detention of Families at Borders, N.Y. TIMiES, Feb. 20, 2015, available
at http://www.nytime-.com/2015/02/21/us/judge -orders stop to detention of families at bor
ders.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HW8J-Y86N ("Homeland Security Secretary Jeh C.
Johnson said the detention policy was devised to send a clear message to families in Central
America, where most of the migrants were from... ").
52 Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, Case No. CV85-4544-RJK (C.D. Cal.
1996).
"The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act: Hearing on S.121 Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Border Security, and Citizenship of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th
Cong. (Feb. 28, 2002) [hereinafter "2002 Child Protection Act Hearing"] (Statement of
Wendy Young, Women's Refugee Commission).
4 See Chen, supra note 41, at 600-02.
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various efforts to hold INS to their Flores duties, and the reports on the INS'
failures to do so as late as 2003.11
c.

Plenary Power Pains

While power-sharing between any two agencies may be fraught with
territorialism and power-plays to maintain traditional areas of control, the
particular context between the federal and state levels in SIJS occurred in the
shadow of the plenary power doctrine. This doctrine has long asserted, inter
alia, that regulation of immigration was a purely federal duty, so states could
not regulate the admission or expulsion of immigrants. Here, because Congress has explicitly delegated a piece of this authority to the state juvenile
courts, the role for the states, while novel, was condoned and therefore constitutional.5 6 It was, however, politically problematic-the immigration
agency within the Executive Branch was effectively ceding power through
the Legislative Branch's actions.
The willingness of Congress to delegate this authority to the states cuts
against one of the bases for the plenary power doctrine: issues concerning
foreign policy, such as migration, are only for the federal political branches.
There has long been criticism of the doctrine as one that rests on very thin
reeds, as well as skepticism about how much immigration decisions truly
would affect foreign policy. But exceptional events, like the Elian Gonzalez
custody battle, showed that at least in exceptional cases, migration issues
could become significant foreign policy issues.57 This possibility has sown
pessimism towards individual states interfering with foreign policy through
state-level immigration laws.58 Yet in the context of SIJS, Congress has permitted precisely that outcome. Congress likely assumed state court findings
about children's best interests would not raise foreign policy issues. While
the possibility of such issues in any given child dependency case seems low,
courts still make merit-based findings by comparing American conditions to
that of the child's home country.59 It is at least plausible to think that the
5 See Somers, supra note 10, at 337-39.
56 The constitutional novelty could, as suggested below, open space for further thinking
about a state role in regulation of immigration, but developing that idea is far beyond the scope
of this article.
" Tim Padgett, How The Battle Over Elidn Gonzdlez Helped Change U.S. Cuba Policy,
NPR, June 28, 2015, available at http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/06/28/4177161
73/how the battle over eli n gonz lez helped change u s cuba-policy, archived at http://pcrma
.cc/9CED D'7M; see also Victor C. Romero, On Elian and Aliens: A PoliticalSolution to the
Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LrGcas. & PuB. POL'Y 343 (2001).
58 With its origins in anti-Chinese immigration policies, it seems that both the states and
the federal government had the same inclination to.create anti-Chinese foreign policy tension,
but the federal government wanted the exclusive right to do so.
" These findings rely upon evidence in the record about safety, and medical and educational opportunities in the home country, and they necessarily (for the child's case to be well
argued) emphasize the worst part. of the home country, and the best.parts of the U.S. Problems
in the source countries are real, but the repeated emphasis uniquely on those aspects of the
three countries certainly feeds a problematic narrative of third-world insolvability that has
been critiqued in international development and human rights literature for decades. See, e.g.,
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source countries for the most SIJ cases (El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala) would react negatively to consistent findings of harms or lack of opportunities within their borders.
The foreign-policy echo of these decisions is borne out by an earlier
history of federal government involvement in determining the best interests
of children. In the aftermath of World War II, prospective immigrant children's best interests had previously been adjudicated by the federal government as a foreign policy matter. At that time, the US accepted a large share
of refugee children from the USSR, ultimately holding that return to the
USSR was not in the children's best interests. This was clearly driven by
Cold War-era concerns as foreign policy driven immigration determinations
were entirely consistent with the criticized, but durable, plenary power doctrine. That 1950s experience was thus typical of the power the federal government had over migration issues, and represents a marked shift in the post1990 power-allocation structure. 60 This also underscores the reality that the
choice of state courts adjudicating best interests was not an historic
inevitability.
C.

a.

1997-2008: Amendments Asserting the Power
of the Federal Government

The Era of Consent

In 1997, a set of amendments to SIJS restricted its scope in ways that
privileged the federal government. This move strengthened federal oversight
of the SIJS process, while substantively fine-tuning the categories of minors
permitted to seek SIJS. The amendment, contained in a DOJ appropriations
law, required the Attorney-General to specifically consent to the dependency
order for a broad range of minors who would otherwise be eligible: minors
in the actual or constructive custody of then-INS.6 This meant that express
consent was required well beyond the situation of minors in the physical
custody of then-INS facilities. "Constructive" custody was interpreted as
applying to minors in the much broader net of removal proceedings. The
case of P.G. v. D.C.F. reveals the extent to which this was a problem. There,
a Florida state court found it had no jurisdiction to hear the case of a minor
Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. IN'L
L.J. 201 (2001) (challenging the narratives of poor country "powerless victims" and human
rights "saviors"). It also ignores real safety issues that follow these children into the United
States. See, e.g., Tim Rogers, 10th Grader's Murder Highlights Threat of MS-13 Gang Violence in American Schools, FusION, Sept. 30, 2015, available at http://fusion.net/story/205810/
1Oth-graders-murder-highlights-threat-of-ms- 13-gang-violence-in-american- schools/, archived
at http://perma.cc/5QRL-S 74T.
See Danicl J. Stcinbock, The Admission Of Unaccompanied Children Into The United
States, 7 YALE L. AND POL. REV. 137, 151 (1989). Subsequent schemes, including programs
for Hungarian refugee post-1956 and Cuban refugee children also existed at the purely federal
level.
61 This iteration of the SIS law spanned the dismantling of the INS in 2002, and the
placement of its functions within the Department of Homeland Security.
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who was neglected and abandoned by both parents because the minor was in
removal proceedings. The child, the state court held, was therefore in constructive custody of the Attorney General and in need of consent.62 (That
breadth of constructive custody shifted in a subsequent case where only immigrants already ordered deported were deemed to be in the constructive
custody of the Attorney General.)63 A 1997 decision later confirmed that
while consent could be given, the courts had no jurisdiction without such
consent. 64
The consent requirement demonstrates a pronounced federal reassertion
of a role in SIJS, both as a jurisdictional matter and as a form of federal gatekeeping. Since even where the state court had jurisdiction as a matter of state
law, the "specific consent" provision would require a federal blessing of the
state court's jurisdiction. For each and every applicant seeking SIJS, then, the
applicant (or most likely, the applicant's attorney or social worker) needed to
first secure this consent. State court orders made without that consent were
hence invalid, even if consent came later.
Early memos interpreting the new version of the law gave the then-INS
enormous powers of review over the substance of the minor's dependency
claims. The first two memos in 1998 and 1999 respectively, asked applicants
to submit evidence of abuse and neglect to the INS, evidence of the location
of parents and other relatives, and a statement of why it would not be in their
best interests to be returned to the countries of origin.65 As Angela Lloyd
has noted:
The overriding problem with each of the first two field memoranda
was that each required the Service to make independent determinations regarding a juvenile applicant's dependency status; thereby
contradicting the Service's own decision in 1993 that 'it would be
both impractical and inappropriate for the Service to routinely
readjudicate judicial or social service agency administrative
66
determinations.
This added considerable difficulty to the process. An Illinois training
manual from this period recounts,

62 See P.G. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 867 So.2d 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2004).
63 Matter of Saint Preux, A97634322 (AAO 6/5/2007).
64"Since the state court lacks jurisdiction to determine the custodial status of an undocu-

mented alien in federal custody, the INS considers these dependency orders to be invalid." INS
Revises Legal Opinion on Special Immigration Status for Juveniles, 74 No. 23 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 964, 965 (1997).
65Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Asst. Comm'r., Adjudications Div., Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., U.S. Dep't. of Just. (Aug. 7, 1998); Memorandum from Thomas
E. Cook, Acting Asst. Comm'r., Adjudications Div., Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., U.S.
Dep't. of Just. (Jul. 9, 1999).
6 Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting Undocumented Immigrant Children
from Their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How to Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997 Amendments
to the Sij Law, 15 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 237, 246 (2006).
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Obtaining DHS's consent to take the child to juvenile court can be
an arduous and lengthy process. In the past, DHS has requested
access to the child's files through ORR and, in certain cases, requested interviews with the child, her caseworker, and others involved in the care of the childgCurrently, no formal procedures or
67
policies exist to govern DHS's inquiry.
Nor was consent a foregone conclusion, although under DHS guidance in
2004, consent was to be given if it appeared the minor would qualify for
SIJS.68 The Illinois manual goes on to say,
In the case where DHS refuses to grant consent to proceed to juvenile court, it may be appropriate to submit additional evidence to
rebut the decision. Should additional evidence not be available,
federal court action may be required. Such action may include filing a writ of mandamus to compel a decision or direct review of a
69
denial of the consent request.
Professor Katherine Porter wrote in the early years after the law's passage,
"Many children who previously were clearly eligible for SIJ status now face
[the] difficult INS bureaucracy, interminable delays, and a tangled web of
laws." 70 The federal insistence on a gate-keeping role in SIJS created a significant barrier to accessing the state courts, and a significant drain on the
legal service community's resources as they sought to comply with this demanding process.
The story, though, is not one-sided. The 1997 amendment also
expanded the range of state entities capable of making these findings. But
while making SIUS findings possible in a broader array of state courts and
agencies, the amendment substantively limited SIJS to include the requirement that the foster-care placement be made as a result of "abuse, abandonment or neglect." This change also opened the door to then-INS looking
behind state court decisions to see if there truly was abuse, abandonment or
neglect, and whether the federal government agreed with the state court interpretations. As Wendi Adelson, an advocate and law professor in Florida,
noted:
[T]he Miami Office of USCIS has repeatedly readjudicated cases
decided by Miami-Dade juvenile court judges based on their own
perceptions of improperly decided adjudications on abuse, abandonment and neglect. Advocates have also encountered situations

67

NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENI ER, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN ILLI-

NOIS: A GUIDE FOR PRO BONO ATORNEYS 9 (June 2007), available at http://www.f2f.ca.gov/
res/pdf/SpeciallmmigrantJuvenile.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5AA3-4E8E.
68 See William R. Yates, Memorandum #3 - Field Guidance on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Petition, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serv., HQADN 70/23 (May 27, 2004).
69 NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 67, at 9.
70 Katherine Porter, In the Best Interests of the INS: An Analysis of the 1997 Amendment

to the Special Immigrant Juvenile Law, 27 J. LEGIS. 441, 442 (2001).
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where their clients' SIJ applicants are denied based on what the
Miami Office of USCIS terms their own "federal" standards of
abuse, abandonment, and neglect [rather than those applied by the
courts with primary jurisdiction over such determinations].71
Professor Daria Fisher Page has shown how, through interpretations of
the consent authority, the 1997 amendments marked the resurgence of the
federal role in SIJS. She writes, "Although the principle of deference [to
state courts] has remained strong in theory, in fact the agency has used its
consent authority to erode deference to the state court findings and to magnify its role as gatekeeper to an immigration benefit. '72 Her argument,
backed by a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Appeals Office
(AAO)'s published decisions from this period, is that the implementing regulations for the consent requirement necessitated the AAO to look behind the
state court proceedings. This would ensure the state-court findings were not
"sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully
permitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining
relief from abuse or neglect." This was true even though agency guidance73
instructed adjudicating officers to not look behind the state-court findings.
Interestingly, the phenomenon of "looking behind" the state court findings worked both for and against the petitioners. Fisher Page finds instances
where the AAO used its consent authority to approve petitions where the
state court predicate orders were facially deficient (e.g. failing to make an
abuse, abandonment, neglect or similar finding). She writes, "Although this
use of consent ultimately benefits the petitioner, it is still indicative of the
agency's very liberal understanding of deference to the state court, in which
it is free, in this category of cases, to read in what is necessary for the adjudication. '74 Fisher Page also documents multiple cases where "looking behind" facially adequate predicate orders worked against the petitioners.
Perhaps most interesting, given the emphasis on state court expertise
for making findings of abuse, abandonment and neglect, and findings concerning children's "best interests," Professor Fisher Page demonstrates how
the AAO engages in such findings itself. Concerning best interests, the AAO
reads such findings into the predicate orders, even in the absence of any
"' Wendi Adelson, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status in Florida:A Guide for Lawyers,
Judges, and Child Advocates 12 n.36 (June 2007), available at https://www.law.miami.edul
clinics/children-and-youth/pdf/2007/special-immigrant-juvenile-manual-2007.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/K3RT-QD8D.
72 Daria Fisher Page, The Tension Between Deference and Consent: An Analysis of the
Jurisprudence of the Administrative Appeals Office in Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
Cases, 1998-2014 (forthcoming, draft on file with the author).
" "Looking behind" the state or local-level findings happens in the U visa context as
well-another argument in support of advocacy to amend the law enforcement certification
requirement. See, e.g., Petition for U Nonimmigrant Classification as a Victim of a Qualifying
Crime Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(U) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. S
I 101(a)(15)(U), 2011 WL 9082005 (denying a case for lack of "qualifying criminal activity"
despite the applicant's signed U visa certification).
" Fisher Page, supra note 72, at *26.
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specific state court conclusion about the whether the child's best interests are
best met by remaining in the United States. 75 More pervasively, there are
multiple cases where the AAO interprets state law in a way that contradicts a
state court's findings about whether abuse, abandonment neglect or other
76
similar basis actually occurred.
b.

Diffusion of Roles at the Federal Level

Within this 1997-2008 period, a major legislative overhaul of immigration led to two major developments in the dynamics of SIJS adjudications.
First was the institutional choice of the Department of Health and Human
Service's Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to take charge of the care
and placement of the minors instead of the Community Relations Service,
which had been part of the INS since 1996.17 ORR set up the still-operational
Division of Unaccompanied Children's Services which, in the words of
ORR, incorporates "child welfare values as well as the principles and provisions established by the Flores Agreement in 1997, the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 and its reauthorization acts, the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2005 and
2008."78 As argued in Part II, infra, this effectively nullified one of the main
arguments for creating the state court role in the first instance.
Less momentous, but also helpful in terms of reducing conflicts of interest, was the dissolution of the INS and absorption of its roles into different bureaus within the new Department of Homeland Security in 2003. 79 In
addition to the challenge of one entity handling both the protection and the
enforcement described above, one agency also handled both prosecution of
removal hearings and the administration and adjudication of those hearings:
the Department of Justice. Now, the hearings remained with DOJ. But the
Department of Homeland Security's new Bureau for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) still had responsibility for the prosecutions in removal cases. The relationship between ICE and the benefits-adjudication
part of the agency remained comparable, with a separate Bureau within DHS
for benefits, just as there had been a separate sub-commission within INS
previously.

" "In one case, the AAO concluded that simply because the child was placed by the court
with a caregiver in the U.S., coupled with other facts regarding the lack of parental supervision, the court had also implicitly found that it was not in the child's best interest to return to
her country of origin." Fisher Page, supra note72, at 27. She also finds a more palatable
interpretation that the AAO takes findings that it is in the child's best interests to remain in the
US to mean the statutory requirement (best interest not to be returned to home country) is
implicitly met. Id.
76Fisher Page, supra note 72 at *30-33.
77Somers, supra note 10, at 334-35, 341.
71Office of Refugee Resettlement, UnaccompaniedChildren'sServices, available at http:/
/www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/ucs, archived at http://perma.cc/V7LT-27KX.
71See Homeland Security Act of 2002, PuB. L. No. 107-296 116 Stat. 2135.
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Federal Role in Decline: 2008 Through the Present

The Wilberforce Amendments

The next major development in SIJS eligibility came in 2008, when
Congress passed the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008. As part of a broader bill combatting human
trafficking, this law significantly broadened SIJ eligibility away from the
foster-care context. The key changes appear in Section 235(d)(1)(A) of the
Act. First, the amendment opens the number and kind of settings where SIJ
findings could be made, and permitted SIJ proceedings for those declared
dependent upon "an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile
court located in the United States," or the minor's guardians or custodians.
Second, the substantive basis of eligibility was no longer linked to eligibility for long-term foster care, but instead linked to whether reunification
with one or both parents was possible. As Kele Stewart and Meghan Johnson
have noted, "When Congress added the language in 2008 that reunification
is not viable with one parent, it intended to expand SIJS eligibility and specifically eliminated language that had previously been interpreted to foreclose one-parent SIJS applications."80
Third, the amendment maintained the general 1997 interest in focusing
on the specific reasons for the minor's situation, but then added some flexibility for those situations where the minor's story did not neatly fit into the
state law definitions of abuse, abandonment or neglect. To those three
grounds, the 2008 law added "or a similar basis found under State law." The
cumulative effect of these three changes meant that now a minor living with
one parent could seeks SIJS, if the other parent had abused, abandoned or
neglected the child, and accounted for situations where the other parent had
died. The focus of the inquiry thus shifted from whether the minor had any
parent to care for him or her (because previously, if they did, then they
would not have been in foster care) to whether it was in the minor's best
interests to be returned to the home country. The minor still needed to show
abuse, abandonment, neglect, or something similar by one of his or her parents, but this expansion permitted many more children to apply.
Finally, the 2008 amendments dramatically reduced the need for federal-level consent, perhaps the most literal gate-keeping role left to the federal entities in this process. Express consent was reserved only for those
cases where a minor in the actual custody of HHS sought to use the familycourt process to change his or her custody to someone other than HHS (a
family member or other guardian, for example). In such cases, the minor
could make the request via a form submitted to HHS-and was guaranteed a
8 Meghan Johnson and Kele Stewart, Unequal Access to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: State Court, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION (July, 14, 2014), available at http://apps
.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/content/articles/summer20l4-0714-un
equal-access-special-immigrant-juvenile-status-state-court-adjudication-one-parent-cases.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/UY74-TXLG.
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response within 30 days.8' The purpose of the HHS consent was "an acknowledgement that the request for SIJ classification is bona fide," meaning
that neither the dependency order nor the best interest determination was
"sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining
relief from abuse or neglect. '8 2 Nonetheless, despite this shift, consent became a significant way for the federal government to continue exerting
authority.
b.

Homeland Security's Continuing Difficulty Accepting the New
Balance of Power

It is admittedly impossible with an institution as complex, disparate and
dispersed as the Department of Homeland Security to ascribe motives to
results. Still, in varied ways, specific implementation problems post-1998
suggest the Department of Homeland Security had difficulty accepting its
more minor role in this process.
First, the agency continued looking behind state adjudications to check
for sufficiency. Three years after the 1998 amendments came into effect, the
USCIS Ombudsman noted a significant problem with the agency looking at
the evidence underlying state court adjudications-one way to reinsert a federal role into the process.83 The USCIS Ombudsman named this as one of the
two most significant problems in adjudication of SIJ petitions by USCIS,
noting that "while USCIS is precluded from re-evaluating the facts and circumstances underlying the juvenile court dependency determination, stakeholders representing SIJ applicants report RFEs seeking access to such
evidence used by the court when making a dependency determination." s To
a great extent, as documented by Fisher Page, such second-guessing still
happens today.85
Second, USCIS faced charges that it frequently failed to decide on
pending adjustment applications for minors whose SIJ petitions had been
"' ACF, Interim Program Instruction: Specific Consent Requests (Dec. 24, 2009), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/offrr/specialimmigrant-juvenile-status-speci
ficconsent-program.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HU7J-G2Y9.
82 DONALD NEUFELD & PEARL CHANG, U.S. CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION AcT OF 2008: SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE
STATUS PROVISIONS, HQOPS 70/8.5 (2009) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-405 at 130 (1997)).
83Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman Recommendation, Special Immigrant Juvenile Adjudications: An Opportunity for Adoption of Best Practices (April 2011),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Citizenship-and-Immigration-Services-Om
budsman-Recommendation-Special-tmmigrant-Juvenile-Adjudications.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/2WVQ-76R6.
84 Id. The Ombudsman clarified the limited appropriateness of seeking to peer behind the
state court determination, and that such revisiting of the state-level events should be reserved
for times that the state order "fails to specify whether it was issued on the basis of abuse,
neglect or abandonment" or has stated an alternate basis like "parental failure to meet
psychosocial or medical needs," and the petitioner needs to establish that the state court finding is similar to abuse, neglect or abandonment.
85 Fisher Page, supra note 72.
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approved-until the minor reached age 21, and aged-out of eligibility. 6 Attorneys for minors alleged, too, that HHS withheld specific consent so that
minors could proceed with their family or juvenile court proceedings, leading many minors to age out before being permitted to proceed. The government eventually settled a class action lawsuit, Perez-Olano v. Holder,
addressing these problems."
For cases permitted to go forward (where jurisdiction was either not at
issue, or where consent to jurisdiction was granted), data from shortly after
the 2008 law took effect show that SIJ approvals rose with a consistently
negligible number of denials by USCIS. For example, of 1,645 applications
in FY2010, only 97 were rejected. That year, 1,590 of the state-level findings built a sufficient case for applicant eligibility. The numbers show that
once a case was under state court jurisdiction, the federal government played
only a slight gatekeeping role for the petitions. This, conversely, demonstrates the enormous gatekeeping role played at the state level; without the
state-level findings (the "predicate order"), no application could be filed, yet
once filed, the state-level predicate order had a 94.25% chance of leading to
successful adjudication at the federal level.
It should be noted that the federal government plays a more significant
role in the second stage of the process, the adjudication of applications for
lawful permanent residence for those with approved SIJ petitions. By contrast with the petition stage, when the petitioner includes only very basic
biographic information along with the state-court order, the second step requires the full gauntlet of screening for inadmissibility issues. This is the
same admissibility screening that any applicant for permanent residence
would face, and it is here that USCIS plays a more vigorous gate-keeping
role. This latter-stage role is the traditional role that the federal government
plays for all applicants seeking permanent residence.
Prior to the Perez-Olano settlement, the federal government's gatekeeping role was felt most strongly first at the level of seeking consent, and
then at the phase of adjudicating applications for adjustment of status. But
within those two stages, state courts played a massive role in determining
which minors could and could not be placed on a path toward lawful permanent residence.
It.

CHANGING ROLES, CHANGING JUSTIFICATIONS

There have been two major justifications for giving a core gatekeeping
role to state juvenile courts at SIJS' inception. First was the competence of
state courts in family law matters and other matters involving children, and
" Signed Settlement Agreement, Perez-Olano v. Holder, Case No. CV 05-3604 (C.D. Cal.
2010). available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Legal%20Settlement
%20Noticeo%20and%20Agreements/Perez Olano%20v%2OHolder/SignedSettlementAgree
ment.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H6QQ-XN6C.
87 Id.
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the relative lack of competence within the INS. Second was the conflict-ofinterest within the then-INS, with its competing enforcement and protection
roles concerning children. This section examines the merits of and critiques
of each justification in 1990 compared with today, and holds that the landscape has changed so significantly that the original justifications for tire state
role are no longer compelling.
As a preliminary matter, it is critical to understand what this article is
not proposing. The article is not proposing to strip state courts of jurisdiction
over custody, guardianship, or dependency proceedings. Litigants who need
to access state courts for any of those purposes would, of course, continue to
have access, The article simply pls forward the arguimieul Ihal state Co1.1u4',
are no longer necessary for the immigration-related determination of
whether it is in the child's best interests to stay in the United States or return
to the child's country of origin. While this would dianiatically simplify the
process for securing the child's immigration status, it does not at all diminish
existing state court jurisdiction over traditional dependency or associated
family law matters.
A.
a.

Institutional Competence

Then: State Court Expertise with No Federal Equivalent

A major and enduring justification for the state court tole celters oi
two related dimensions of competence. First is the substantive judicial expertise in the adjudication of children's "best interests." Second is the effectiveness of the forum itself for meeting the requirements of the statute. In
the substantive expertise lile of argument, state courts are infinitely better
suited to handle "best interests" kind of adjudication than immigration
courts. Professor David Thronson has argued this most forcefully. He argues
that immigration courts treat children as adults with no accommodations for
age, contrasted with state court competence in handling proceedings for minors. 8 While not all state courts are particularly less harried than immigration courts, 89 and child-protection proceedings have themselves been heavily
criticized, 90 it is true that immigration courts simply are not set up to play the
in loco parentis role that a good state court can. The currently massive dockets of minors have placed an exceptional strain on court resources, including
the judges who are trying diligently to ensure the ongoing safety, care, and
" David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kid? Reconisidering Conceptiur uf Childi n's Right.%
Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 979, 1000 (2002).
11The author has practiced in both state court at the D.C. Superior Court and immigration
courts in multiple states, and is drawing upon personal experiences for this assertion, For a
critique of the realities of domestic violence courts in particular, which share a concern for
helping "victims," see Leigh Goodmark, Clinical Cognitive Dissonance: The Values and
Goals of Domestic ViolenLe CliniL6, the Legal System, uad the Student Caught in th, Middle,
20 J.L. & POL'Y 301, 315-23 (2012)
90 See Matthew Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Conjientialityand the Master Narra
tives of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REv. 1 (2010).
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education of the. many children appearing before them in a single morning or
afternoon. This difference-compaiing the potential of state court to the
grim reality of alternatives within the immigration system in 1990-certainly created a powerful justification for the state court role.
Another fear at the time was that immigration judges, or the INS offices, would begin questioning children about sensitive issues of abuse, neglect, abandonment and so forth. And as Professor Thronson has written,
Given that the basic framework of immigration law fails to recognize that children exist without parents, substantive and procedural
rules do virtually nothing to account for the possibility of children
in proceedings unaccompanied by parents. When children find
themselves in immigration proceedings unaccompanied by adults,
the same substantive rules, evidentiary requirements, and procedural complexities that apply to adults also apply to them. Rather
than remedies and procedures tailored for children, children suffer
the same harsh consequences and limited procedural protections
faced by adult immigrants."
Moreover, in 1990, the INS received massive internal and external criticism for being poorly managed: the GAO reported that "INS continues to be
'an agency at odds with itself,' with overlapping and inconsistent programs,
'weak management systems,' a lack of 'clearly defined goals, priorities and
plans,' and a decade of 'inconsistent leadership."' 9 2 Faced with the prospect
of a pooly managed entity undertaking sensitive adjudications of vulnerable
children's claims, legislators had a powerful motivation to seek an alternative. No doubt, they found this alternative in state courts.
It is also important to understand what the then-INS's adjudicatory experience consisted of in 1990. The contrast in expertise at that time was
indeed stark. The INS of 1990 had not yet begun to undertake adjudication
of visas and petitions for domestic violence, human trafficking and othercrime survivors as those only entered the law as late as 1994. The asylum
regime was ten years old, but already a line had been established between
unaccompanied refugee minors (whose claims had been adjudicated prior to
their arrival in the United States) and unaccompanied minors who were
"treated in a punitive and hostile manner" and often faced rapid removal.
This set of experiences argued against putting more questions of child safety
93
in the hands of the INS.
Arguably the closest family-related benefit adjudication within INS at
that time was the quest to discern whether marriages were made in "good
faith," a requirement aimed at reducing marriage fraud. The general rule for
9'Thronson, supra note 88, at 1000.
92 General Counsel Both Blast INS as Poorly Run, 67 No. 44 Interpreter Releases 1325,

1325 (1990).
93Somers, supra note 10, at 335. Somers has noted, "this meant that there were two
parallel systems for custody in the United States for children, vho in man) ways, were similarly situated in their flight from civil wars, persecution, and exploitation." Id. at 337.
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recognizing the legality of a marriage was that it had to be valid where performed-therefore if a state issued a marriage license, the marriage was acceptable for immigration purposes, despite the wide variety of state rules
about who could or could not get married. The petitioners, however, also had
to show that it was a genuine, "good faith marriage" not entered into for
immigration purposes. This required a good deal of sensitivity and casespecific balancing of a host of factors,9 4 and Congress was at ease asking the
INS to look behind the state law's issuance of a marriage license in order to
make that determination.95 As Professor Abrams has noted, this is the opposite of a [formalist] understanding of marriage, wherein having the marriage
certificate is the only matter of concern. Instead, "good faith marriage" adjudications closely-many say overly-inquire into the ways in which a
couple's marriage has manifested in such things as joint finances, travel history, relationships with in-laws, and more. 96 This adjudication, though, had
nothing to do with children or children's best interests, and was thus presumably deemed too remote to provide any useful comparison for what the SIJfindings process might look like if handled on the federal level.
The state court forum itself was also well suited to the more limited
form of SIJS that existed between 1990 and 1997. During that time,-,most
unaccompanied minors who were SIJ-eligible were already before state
courts as part of their dependency proceedings. For dependency purposes,
the courts were already examining their interests, their placements, and so
forth. Securing a finding to satisfy SIJS requirements involved an additional
burden on the children's attorneys, albeit a relatively small one because the
court already had jurisdiction over the children's cases. Moreover, minors
whose cases were already before the court did not face some of the procedural oddities described in Part I1.B, infra, such as filing custody cases where
there is no contesting party, or effectuating service on disappeared or deceased parents in foreign countries.

9 "Evidence to establish intent could take many forms, including, but not limited to,
proof that the beneficiary has been listed as the petitioner's spouse on insurance policies, property leases, income tax forms, or bank accounts; and testimony or other evidence regarding
courtship, wedding ceremony, shared residence, and experiences." Matter of Laureano, 19 1. &
N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 1983).
9 "It is impossible to contradict the Service's assessment that it lacks the 'expertise,' and
is not 'qualified,' to do individualized child-placement studies, and the right alleged here provides no basis for this Court to impose upon what is essentially a law enforcement agency the
obligation to expend its limited resources in developing such expertise and qualification. That
reordering of priorities is for Congress-which has shown, we may say, no inclination to
shrink from the task. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (requiring INS to determine if applicants for
immigration are involved in 'sham' marriages); Reno, 507 U.S. at 1445 (1993). In one early
case where the petitioner had not shown any evidence of a bona fide marriage, the Board of
Immigration Appeals noted that "the marriage is deemed invalid for immigration purposes
regardless of whether it would be considered valid under the domestic law of the jurisdiction
where performed. See Matter of M--,
8 I. & N. Dec. 217, 217 (BIA 1958) (emphasis
added).
96 See Abrams, supra note 14. Indeed, as Professor Abrams notes, the immigration law
regulates family relationships extensively now.
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Finally, in many states-38 as of the most recent report looking at children's right to counsel across the United States-the child in proceedings has
some level of right to representation, which is thus far absent in the immigration context.97 To be sure, 12 states permit appointed counsel as a discretionary matter, but it is not required.
For the most part, this competence justification for the state court role
endures. Arguably, however, the federal government now has concurrent expertise in this area that should not be overlooked.
b.

Now: Concurrent Competence

At the outset, it is critical to note that "competence" does not mean
perfection. If it did, even state courts would be inadequate.98 When I consider institutional competence, I define it to mean that the agency has sufficient structures, processes, training, and experience to handle cases
responsibly, including sufficient safeguards to correct mistakes that do happen. As one scholar considering the role of state court in adjudicating children's rights wrote:
When we ask, as a policy matter, which institution in a democratic
republic should make a decision, we are really asking which institution is best suited to carry out the task. This recognizes three
things. First, institutions have different competencies-or example, courts are better at adjudicating individual disputes than a legislature. Second, all institutions may be capable, but one is more
capable than the others. Third, no institution may be ideal, but we
have to pick between the lesser of two (or several) evils. Thus,
institutional competence is relative. 9
97

CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INSTITUTE, FIRST STAR, UNIV. OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW,

A CHILD'S RIGHT TO CouNsEl.: A NATIONAL REPORT CARl) ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR

1, 20, 22-23 (2009), available at http://www.caichildlaw
.org/Misc/FinalRTC_2nd.Editionjlr.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G2N2-JZNH; see also
Benjamin Good, A Child's Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RITS. &
Crv. LIBERTIES 109, 111 (2014).
ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHn.DREN

9 See, e.g., FEERICK CENTER FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNACCOMPANIED IMMIGRANT CHRDRFN PROJECT STATE COURT WORKING GROUP (Mar. 2014) [hereinafter NYUICP

Report] (describing the flaws and inconsistencies in the New York City court system that is
otherwise well-regarded), available at http://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/3019/
findings-from-a-survey-of lawyers-representing-immigrant youth eligible for special-im
migrantjuvenilestatusinnys family-court.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UW4V-3NZ8.
" Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards A Comprehensive and Consistent
Vision of Children and Their Status under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 275, 370
(2006); see also Pulitzer, supra note 10, at 223 ("When SIJS was enacted, there was an expectation that children and youth in need of protection would benefit from the chance to appear
before a 'neutral' entity that had expertise in adjudicating children's cases. If New York is any
indication, state courts might not be as neutral as anticipated. The simple fact is that when
judges adjudicate cases involving requests for special findings, the proceeding becomes
tainted. The focus shifts away from a child's best interests and towards immigration gatekeeping. Knowledge of SIJS has now started to impact negatively state court proceedings. The
result is a best interest of the child standard that is two-tiered, whereby abused, abandoned, and
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This section explores how state courts do, unquestionably, still have a high
degree of competence (especially considering experience, training and structures) to determine a child's best interests. Likewise, it examines how the
federal government now has comparable competence, with years of training
and experience adjudicating comparably complex issues, and with procedures better suited to most SIJS-eligible children.
i.

State Court Competence Today

The original focus on institutional competence concerned itself primarily with the ability to handle sensitive family law determinations and to deal
with minors in a litigation process. In both cases, the state courts still clearly
have competence. As late as 2011, when USCIS issued draft regulations for
comment, USCIS noted the state court's expertise at determining the viabilit),
of parental reunification.' ® And perhaps for one specific sub-category of
SIJS-eligible minors, those in foster care and dependency proceedings, the
analysis ends there. For these cases, the role and advantages of state court
have not significantly changed. The process still largely works without some
of the problems that have emerged for others as SIJS has changed and
evolved. Experts such as Professor Hlass and others, however, have noted
how state screening procedures and policies may make access to SIJS via the
foster-care system unpredictable and uneven as well.' 0'
State court competence itself has several important caveats. First, state
courts and dependency proceedings have been criticized by scholars of family law for being narrow in their conception of litigants' best interests, being
overly secretive (for dependency proceedings), and providing a hostile forum for a variety of litigants.'0 2 Second, state courts have not been uniformly
well-disposed toward immigrant litigants,'0 3 or well-informed about immigration law. t4 Multiple courts have determined that a parent's immigration
status is a relevant factor in determining custody. 05 In her discussion of one
neglected immigrant children are treated differently than their U.S.-citizen counterparts in
family and juvenile court.").
100Department of Homeland Security Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg.
54978-01 (Sept. 11, 2011) ("Determining the viability of reunification with one or both of a
child's parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under State law is a
question that lies within the expertise of the juvenile court, applying relevant State law.").
...
See Hlass, supra note 10.
"' See Goodmark, supra note 89.
"03David Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of Un
documented Immigrants in U.S. State courts, II Thnx. Hisp. J. L. & POL'Y 45 (2005).
'" "The main immigration statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") is hundreds of pages long and written in a highly technical manner that can be opaque and confusing
to outsiders. Even intelligent and experienced judges can have a difficult time understanding
the provisions of the INA, especially if their practice does not normally involve interpreting
it."
Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the Child Standard, 14 VA. J.
Soc. PoL'Y & L. 87, 92 (2006).
105 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Ramirez, 2007 WL 1192587 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); In re Duenas,
725 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006); Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 120 P.3d 812
(2005); see generally Ann M. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody, Abuse and Adoption
Cases § 4:19.50 ("Immigration Status").
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such case from Nevada, Professor Abrams comments, "the [Rico v. Rodriguez opinion] serves as an example of how damaging a state court's misperceptions about federal immigration law can be, and shows how these
misperceptions can significantly affect the outcome in child custody
cases."10
In many jurisdictions, well-trained judges embrace their role in the SIJ
process, and attorneys have no trouble achieving favorable outcomes for eligible clients. But in some of the worst cases, noncitizens seeking custody of
their children have faced overt discrimination as a result of their immigration
status.107 Sarah Rogerson notes that the tension between parental and child's
rights is magnified when immigration enforcement systems in particular are
involved. Indeed, a "parent's unauthorized status, potential state criminal
conviction and/or incarcerated status, can be unfairly and disproportionately
counted against both parental fitness and the best interests of the childparticularly if the child is a United States citizen." 108 A detained immigrant
parent might not be able to help her child apply for SIJS, even if the child is
otherwise eligible, because the mother's detention would be considered a
negative factor for establishing her custodial rights. This is the case even
though custody is the mechanism through which the court has jurisdiction to
issue the necessary SIJ findings.
Professor Rogerson notes another problematic outcome in abuse and
neglect proceedings. For example, a typical case could involve a mother who
is subjected to intense domestic violence, who is unable to leave the home,
and who is then convicted of failing to protect her child from harm. Because
this kind of conviction is a deportable offense, the mother may be deported
and the child could then go into the custody of the abusive father. Rogerson
writes, "The child welfare system and immigration enforcement mechanisms operate independent of one another with little regard for how actions
in one can impact a parent's legal rights in the other, often permanently separating children from their parents."' 9 Professor Theo Liebmann underscores
this point in his examination of how admissions made by litigants in state
court can have negative immigration consequences.110 State court's appropriateness as the institution of choice for the SIJS procedure thus comes with
some significant critiques.

06 Abrams, supra note 104, at 88 (2006).
'07Thronson, supra note 10, at 54-58.
108 Sarah Rogerson, Lack of Detained Parents' Access to the Family Justice System and the
Unjust Severance of the Parent.Child Relationship, 47 F ,a. LQ, 111 116 (2013).
09 Sarah Rogerson, Unintended and Unavoidable: The Failure to Protect Rule and Its
Consequencesfor Undocumented Parents and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT. Rev. 580, 580
(2012).
"0 Theo Liebmann, Family Court and the Unique Needs of Children and Families Who
Lack Immigration Status, 40 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 583, 584 (2007).
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ii. Federal Competence Today: HHS and DHS
The major change between 1990 and 2015 is that state courts do not
alone possess competence. Rather, since the inception of the 1990 law, the
federal government has gained considerable traction in this area.
First, the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee
Resettlernen (ORR) already does muclh Of 11V, irieIrviewilIg Himlevalialiii
of the children's best interests as part of the process of releasing minors to
suitable caretakers. The first two responsibilities ORR lists concerning unaccompanied minors are 1) "[m]aking and implementing placement decisions
for the unaccompanied children" and 2) "[e]nsuring that the interestsof the
child are considered in decisions related to the care and custody of unaccompanied children."'' Such decisions are already undertaken for each child
apprehended at the border and placed in HHS custody, and encompass much
of the kind of fact-finding the system currently assigns to the state courts.
HHS also provides ongoing monitoring of the children's placements to best
12
ensure the child's ongoing wellbeing.
Second, within the Department of Homeland Security itself, USCIS has
far more experience adjudicating complex family issues. This is :done
through the Violence Against Women Act Unit (VAWA Unit, also known as
the Crime Victims Unit) located within the USCIS Vermont Service Center
and through the Administrative Appeals Office. The latter agency looks at
VAWA Unit decisions de novo, playing an important feedback role in trying
to ensure that everything from the application of evidentiary standards to the
legal interpretations of various statutory terms are consistent and accurate.
Since not all SIJS-eligible children are in HHS custody, it is important to
understand how DHS, too, has expertise in areas comparable to that of state
courts.
Three humanitarian forms of protection fall under the VAWA Unit's jurisdiction: T-visas for human trafficking survivors, 113 U visas for survivors
or indirect victims of serious crimes, 14 and Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) self-petitions for abused spouses of citizens or lawful permanent
residents." 5 Each of these demands that adjudicators make multi-variable
decisions on a host of eligibility requirements, and that the adjudicators be
aware of such influencing factors as trauma, dynamics of abuse. Because
many of those involved in SIJS are less familiar with these adjudications and
the VAWA Unit process, below is a summary of the kinds of decisions that
the VAWA Unit and the Administrative Appeals Office routinely make.
1 Emphasis added. Office of Refugee Settlement, About Unaccompanied Children's Services, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/program/orr/programs/ucs/about, archived at http:/
/perma.cc/SVQ3-JPGP.
2
11 See id.
1'3 See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386 Division A, 114
Stat. 1464.
4
11 See id.
"' Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902.
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U visas: Generally, U visas are available to those noncitizens who have
been the victim of one or more of a host of serious crimes, ranging from rape
to child abuse to assault to extortion. The visa applicant needs law enforcement to certify, essentially, that they were a victim of the qualifying crime
(or equivalent crime); that they possess information about the crime; and that
they have been, are, or are willing to be helpful to law enforcement in the
investigation or prosecution of this crime. Although the certification requirement exists in order to draw upon the expertise of the law enforcement entity
most closely involved with assessing whether a crime occurred, and then
investigating and prosecuting it, the VAWA.Unit revisits those determinations by applying the facts and evidence as presented by the applicant to the
relevant state statutes. While this is a valid criticism of the certification process, it demonstrates the kinds of analysis experience USCIS already
possesses.
Beyond what law enforcement can certify, which it does through the
Supplement B certification discussed in Part 1(a) supra, the applicant must
also show that they suffered extreme physical or mental abuse" 6 as a result
of the crime. This last element, adjudicated uniquely by the VAWA Unit,
examines multiple complex factors, including:
the severity of the perpetrator's conduct, the severity of the harm
suffered, the duration of the infliction of the harm and the extent to
which there is permanent or serious harm to the appearance,
health, or physical or mental soundness of the victim, including
aggravatiofn of pre-existing conditions.' 7
To do this, the VAWA Unit typically weighs evidence such as the applicant's
own statement, medical records, witness letters, psychological evaluations,
and so forth, and will request further evidence from the applicant if the initial application is insufficient.' 8
T Visas: T visas have more elements requiring USCIS-only analysis (as
opposed to local law enforcement analysis). A labor trafficking survivor
must show that he or she was (1) recruited, obtained, etc. (2) through force,
fraud or coercion, for (3) the purpose of involuntary servitude, debt bondage,
peonage, or slavery. 9 Sex trafficking victims need to show that a (1) commercial sex act was (2) induced through force, fraud or coercion. Like U
applicants, T applicants also need to show their willingness to cooperate
with law enforcement, although they do not have to do so through a certifi-

116 "Abuse" is an oddly narrow word for this requirement, as the regulations define this in
terms of a broader range of harms than "abuse."
117 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(1) (2013).
"' See, e.g., Petition for U Nonimmigrant Classification as a Victim of a Qualifying
Crime Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(U) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. S
1101(a)(15)(U), 2015 WL 1189756 (noting that Vermont Service Center requested further evidence on, inter alia, the subject of mental or physical abuse).
'"See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2012); 8 CFR § 214.11(a).
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cation, 20 and they can avail of a trauma exception to this requirement. And
finally, the applicants need to show that they would "suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm if removed from the United States."
Many ternis of these requirements are temis of art that tequire significant
factual analysis, including but not limited to "coercion," "involuntary servitude" and "unusual and severe harm." The VAWA Unit is, for example,
weighing whether threats of deportation constitute "coercion," or whether
more indicators of coercion are required, whether an exceedingly low rate of
pay places the labor inside or outside the confines of "involuntary servitude," and wlieltei fear of rejalialiom from lih, Irafficktr's network constitutes "unusual and severe harm." All of these questions require inquiry into
sensitive subjects or complicated psychological dynamics or both-something the VAWA Unit has developed the competence to do through trainings
and practice.
VAWA Self-Petitions: Some aspects of VAWA eligibility are simple: a
2
petitioner must have married a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.' '
Others are more subtle: they must have a good faith marriage (a multi-factor
analysis discussed supra in the general marriage context), jointly resided
together (oftentimes clea-cut, but sometimes not), and the person fiust have
suffered battery or extreme cruelty front his or her spouse.'2 2 The regulations
defining extreme cruelty show the difficulty of developing a legal standard
for a concept so complex that it is often illustrated as a wheel with spokes
and wedges: eight behavioral spokes and eight wedges cover the categories
of possible harms a domestic violence victim might experience, from economic harm to psychological harm.123 Per the regulations, battery or extreme
cruelty "includes, but is not limited to, being the victim of any act or
threatened act of violence, including any forceful detention, which results or
threatens to result in physical or mental injury."'' 2 4 The regulations go on to
define "acts of violence" to include, inter alia, "psychological or sexual
abuse or exploitation."'25 One example of a finding of extreme cruelty occurred in a case where the Administrative Appeals Office overturned a decision of the VAWA Unit because the wrong evidenutiaiy standaid had beeni
applied; the case involved sexual degradation, lack of medical care and verbal abuse which led to depression and suicidal ideation-- a cluster of factors

2 Of the approximately two doien T visa applications I submitted, none had a law enforcement certification (despite multiple criminal investigations) and all were approved with
out the certification.
121 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l).
122VAWA iSq.lo availghle to some children of US citizens or LPRs, but for simplicity I

am discussing only spousal petitions here.
23 S.e, e.g., MTINNESOTA

Cnii-R

AOAINST VIOLIlNCL AmJ

Arusv, I,,:iiiigeant and Refugee

Power and Control Wheel (June 2002), available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/
immigrantwheel/immigrantwheel.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PF47-BH3E.
248 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(vi) (2007).
125

Id.
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that further demonstrates USCIS' experience considering difficult issues and
interpreting amorphous legal terms.
For all three of these kinds of adjudications, USCIS now has experience
and ability to undertake the requisite evidentiary analysis, weighing mulltiple
variables to assess whether a certain level of harm has occurred, and considering the ways that vulnerability and trauma might affect the individual's
statements, story, ability to collect evidence and so forth. USCIS established
(ie cerlialized office, Ilie VAWA Uhuit, to handle adjudlications of these case
from across the nation, meaning there is one set of officers to train and
retrain, and one place where advocates can work with the government to
improve implementation of the law and quality of decisions. The VAWA
Unit has decades of experience and training in these issues, from trainings
on the law itself to cultural competence and trauma training. All of this
collected wisdom comprises expertise the agency sintilaily needs in the SIJS
coittexl, to assess whether abuse, almidlotniuiel or neglect has occiited, and
whetler it is in the child's best inletests to be retutned to the home couttry.
Decisions of the Unit can be appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office
(AAO) within USCIS, another centralized unit. The AAO provides de novo
consideration of the applications, and routinely reviews any trending issues
or problems with the Vermont Service Center.
What about the experience from the applicant's perspective? Here, too,
the USCIS alternative is significantly different from the immigration court
alternative feared by advocates when SIJS was first created. The process for
affirmative applications before USCIS is non-adversarial, and done entirely
in writing at the application or petition stage. This permits the applicant to
present a carefully written personal statement that might be developed and
refined over multiple interviews. This also comes with the chance for the
applicant to build a tnsting relationship with their attorney who can probe
inconsistencies, dig more deeply into holes in the story and so forth.126 This
stauds in stark contrast to the often difficult experience of testifying in court
and being cross-examined by both the Government attorney and, often, by
the Immigration Judge him or herself. 2

126 The depth of effort taken on client statements of course varies from attorney to attorney, but best practices abound. See, e.g. Evangeline Abriel and Sally Kinoshita, TimVAWA
MANUAl: IMMIGRATION REIE1F FOR ABUSED IMMIGRANTS, Chapter 4 (6th Ed.. 2014): Stacy
Caplow, Putting the "I" In Wr*t*ng: Drafting an a/effective Personal Statement to Tell A
Winning Refugee Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 249 (2008).
127 Inevitably, without an adversary, the emerging concern is fraud, for could it not be
%t,.asl to put forward a false story without an advcisdry? The aswiL t tdt is twofuld. First,
practically, the Department of Homeland Security careffilly screens any cases where adjudicatort suspect fraud, and have an active unit devoted to fraud investigation. Second, while state
coirt proceedings are set up in an adversarial posture, by the time of the hearing, it is exceedingly rate for the adversadral patty to appca and p'oyid testimony, which means state Couowt
judges, too, are relying only upon the facts introduced by one party.
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The applicant (or in the case of VAWA or SIJS, the petitioner) 28 assembles all available evidence-and the standard for VAWA petitions and T and
U visa applications is all credible evidence.2 9 Even in removal proceedings,
the standard "favors admissibility as long as the evidence is shown to be
probative of relevant matters and its use is fundamentally fair so as not to
deprive the alien of due process of law."' 30 This standard is much more forgiving than the standard for admitting evidence in state court where, for
example, hearsay is generally not allowed and where authentication rules for
evidence can be quite strict.
To illustrate the breadth of evidence that might be included to support a
VAWA self-petition-a petitioning process that shows what a strictly-federal
SIJS process might look like-the regulations themselves suggest an enormous range of potential supporting documents:
[R]eports and affidavits from police, judges and other court officials, medical personnel, school officials, clergy, social workers,
and other social service agency personnel. Persons who have obtained an order of protection against the abuser or have taken other
legal steps to end the abuse are strongly encouraged to submit copies of the relating legal documents. Evidence that the abuse victim
sought safe-haven in a battered women's shelter or similar refuge
may be relevant, as may a combination of documents such as a
photograph of the visibly injured self-petitioner supported by affidavits. Other forms of credible relevant evidence will also be considered. Documentary proof of non-qualifying abuse may only be
used to establish a pattern of abuse and violence and to support a
claim that qualifying abuse also occurred.'
This expansive view of probative evidence is enormously helpful to attorneys trying to bring to life both the legal elements and the human elements
of any given case.'

8Functionally, applicants and petitioners are very similar, but petitions are filed as a first
stage to establish eligibility for a permanent residence, while one files an application for a
visa-hence referring to SIJS and VAWA petitioners, but U or T visa applicants.
129 See INA § 204(a)(1)(J) ("In acting on [VAWA] petitions... shall consider any credible
evidence relevant to the petition. The determination of what evidence is credible and the
weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security]"); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(4) (establishing the "any credible evidence" standard
for U visas); 8 C.F.R. § 214.1 l(d)(3) (establishing the "any credible evidence" standard for T
visas).
3' Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980)
1318 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv).
132 At a non-profit where I worked alongside social workers to develop client's cases, I
assembled all of the above for various clients, but also submitted such evidence as the meticulously hand-written notes a client had written on a photocopy of the power and control wheel
(a process she said made her finally connect the dots of all the things her husband had done to
her over the years), a drawing a trafficking survivor's child had made of "her past, her present,
and her future" showing her past as a sad little girl in the home where her mother had been
forced to work. The "all credible evidence" standard helped me go beyond meeting the legal
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In sum, while the states retain competence, albeit subject to critique, the federal government has two agencies with comparable
competence. HHS already undertakes a best interests assessment
for unaccompanied minors, thus rendering the state court role
somewhat duplicative. And DHS has capacity to make such decisions after many years of experience adjudicating similarly difficult and complex issues in other areas of humanitarian relief. This
is a significant change in the landscape of institutional competence
between 1990 and the present.
B.
a.

Conflict-of-Interest

Then: Jailer and Caregiver

In 1990, the then-INS was in charge of both care for these unaccompanied minors, and prosecuting deportation proceedings against them-a significant institutional conflict of mission. As Aryah Somers writes, "[T]he
INS became the custodian and prosecutor of unaccompanied children detained while crossing the border or within the United States."' 33 This
conflict was one justification for putting state courts at the heart of the new
immigration status: the 1990 law makes the role of juvenile courts central to
the entire eligibility process, requiring dependency and judicial findings of
fact about the minor's best interests. 3 4 In the words of one judge concurring
in the result for a SIJ appeal won by the government:
When all is said and done with this case, I believe we have followed the law, but I feel uneasy. We have accomplished nothing
constructive. I am not comfortable with the INS holding itself out
as Y.W.'s guardian, while at the same time they vigorously line up
a case to deport him.'35
In 2002, in hearings reviewing proposals to improve the process for children,
Senator Kennedy noted a similar concern:
We know enough about the Immigration Service that it has two
functions: One is law enforcement and one is a support functionI to support those that have legitimate interest in coming here. And
the review of the history of responsibility that was given to this
program would demonstrate, I think quite clearly, that this has
been more of a law enforcement function rather than it has been in

elements-which were all there-to painting a fuller picture of the clients, the harms done to
them, their favorable discretionary factors, and so forth.
Somers, supra note 10, at 334.
...
4 1990 SIJS Law, supra note 31, §153(a)(3).
'3 Welfare of Y.W., No. C8-96-715, 1996 WL 665937, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19,
1996).
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terms as a supportive function to the most vulnerable people in our
136
society, which are the children in our society."
For children's rights advocates, the results of this were disastrous, with
significant violations of rights by the agency charged with protecting them.
Wendy Young, Director of the Women's Refugee Commission testified that
"Children are subject to handcuffing and shackling, even at times during
their immigration hearings. Translation assistance is rare. In some facilities,
access to the outdoors is extremely limitedl Children are sometimes misclassified as adults and are co-mingled in adult detention centers or prisons." "'37At the same hearing, Andrew Morton, a lawyer who headed a project
at Arnold and Porter to increase access to counsel for these children, described it as follows:
INS now has the incompatible yet simultaneous roles as caregiver,
prosecutor and jailer. And most troubling, in the absence of counsel to advocate and safeguard a child's legal interests, each and
every INS decision respecting the well-being of a detained and
unrepresented child remains completely uncheckedtAs Ameri;
cans, we never would stand for a system where the district attorney serves as public defender in the same. For the same reasons,
the INS, with its primary mission of immigration law enforcement,
simply cannot ensure the legal interests of an unrepresented child.
They should want that responsibility; they should not have that
responsibility. The system is to blame, and the system must be
fixed.38
These concerns centered squarely on the children's protection, and did not
stretch to the adjudication of the children's visa applications, although the
visa-adjudication and enforcement functions were relatively closely held
139
within the then-INS.
b.

Now: Attenuated Conflicts

The original conflict-of-interest justification changed substantially in
2002 when the prosecution function shifted to the new Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the new Department of Homeland
Security, and the custody function went to Department of Health and Human
Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).140 As one Vera Institute
1362002 Child Protection Act Hearing, supra note 53 (statement of Senator Kennedy).

Id.; see also Somers, supra note 10, at 338-40.
Child Protection Act Hearing, supra note 53 (statement of Andrew Morton).
" The functions were under different associate commissioners below the Commissioner
him or herself-who was subordinate to the Attorney-General within DOJ.1987 INS Organizational Chart on file with the author.
"~See generally Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cu6lar, and Barry R. Weingast,
Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the PoliticalDesign of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 673, 702-04 (2006). "Put differently, Members of Congress knowingly pass an inco137

1382002
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report stated, "In 2002, the conflict of interest was finally resolved."'' 4'
While this still means one agency of the federal government is concerned
with the enforcement of immigration laws against the minors, and another
agency is charged with tending to their long-tern interests, the diffusion of
roles across agencies significantly lowers the conflict. 142 Indeed, as Bijal
Shah has been studying, even when agencies intend to cooperate across
agency lines, a host of factors makes such inter-agency cooperation ex43
tremely difficult.
A less dramatic intra-agency conflict continues to exist within DHS,
because USCIS is charged with administering benefits while ICE is charged
with enforcement and removal. This conflict is common to so many immigration cases-cases in removal where the immigrant has some benefit she
or he can apply for before USCIS. Professor Shah notes how in phased interagency coordination, the first fact-finding agency may be the prosecutor
when the second agency takes its turn at review, as happens with asylum
adjudications (reviewed first by USCIS within DHS, then prosecuted by ICE
within DHS once the proceedings are referred over the Department of Justice).'" Interestingly, in her article devoted to the problems associated with
coordination, Professor Shah notes this dual role, but meets it with more
description than critique. This suggests its relative benign-ness in the system.
The depth and implications of possible intra-agency conflicts of interest
within DHS are beyond the scope of this article, and worthy of deeper consideration. It is important, however, to recognize that being within one
agency does little or nothing to guarantee homogeneity of approach of the
entities within the agency. Professor Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule
peer into intra-agency power-sharing, like this division between USCIS and
ICE, and note how agencies are a "They, not an It. Even casual observers of
the administrative state recognize that agencies, like nearly all large organizations, are not unitary actors. They are fractured internally.' ' 45 This obserprovisions are internally iuconsistent to tie point of profound arnbiheient measure, in that its
guity, whon they would not be able to pass the more coherent version. Scc id. at 701.
14 Olga Byrne & Elise Miller, The Flow of Unaccompanied Children Through the ImmigrationSystem: A resourcefor Practitioners,Policy Makers, and Researchers, VERA CENTER
oN IMMIGRAION AND JUSvrCE (Mar. 2012), at 6, available at http://www.vera.org/sitc3/default/filos/resourcos/downloads/the flow-of unaccompanied children through the immigra
tion-system.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MUB4-3R36.
142 See Maura M. Ooi, UnaccompaniedShould Not Mean Unprotected: The Inadequacies
of Relieffor Unaccompanied Immigrant Minors, 25 Go. IMMIGR. L.J. 883, 887 (2011) ("To
an extent, procedural concerns have been addressed by the separation of enforcement and
caretaking responsibilities in the Homeland Security Act, the adoption of the Flores settlement
agreement as agency policy in 1996, and most recently, the enactment of the TVPRA.").
14' Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV.
805, 833 (2015).
'4An initial agency may also play the role of both "trial court" and '""prosecutor" (in
defense of the agency's decision before the appellate level agency). In the immigration/asylum
context, the DHS takes on the role of advocate for the government in administrative appeals
before the DOJ. Thus, the agency acting as the initial-level adjudicator of the asylum case
becomes the asylum applicant's adversary at the agency appeals level." Id.
"' Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YArLE
L.J. 1032, 1036 (2011).
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vation is particularly true of the Department of Homeland Security, long
criticized for its lack of cohesion (mirrored and perhaps caused by the extraordinary range of Congressional committees and subcommittees providing oversight to its work), and founded in a task to meet a dizzying array of
divergent goals.146 And indeed, the divergence and diversity manifests in
simple but important ways in immigration court-this is where the rubber
meets the road for Special Immigrant Juveniles. 47 And as a matter of policy,
USICS does not routinely refer denied SIJ petitioners to ICE for issuance of
a Notice to Appear that would commence removal proceedings (applicants
already in proceedings have previously been issued with such a Notice, and
the denial of the petition would therefore come to ICE and the Court's
attention). 148
Thus, to the extent that the conflict-of-interest within the INS created a
justification for the state court role, that justification either no longer exists
or is sharply attenuated.

1I.

A

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM WITH SIGNIFICANT PRACTICAL COSTS

Thus far, the Article has shown that as the law and its implementing
contexts have changed since 1990, the need for the state role has sharply
diminished. This matters because the state-court role in the immigration system is not merely a conceptual oddity in immigration federalism, but an
entrenched reality that brings with it significant, currently undervalued,
costs. While recognizing that the system works well for many children in
particularly accessible jurisdictions, the Article turns to the costs that have
not yet been thoroughly examined. In this section, the Article demonstrates
that the problems range from unequal implementation of the law across jurisdictions (one of the best studied aspects of the state court role), to legal
infirmities resulting from the "consent" function discussed above, to the access to justice issues created by the bifurcated and complex nature of
proceedings.
A.

Geographic DisparitiesMean a Federal Statute is Not Truly Federal

Several scholars have studied the ways that SIJ availability varies depending on geography. Professor Hlass in particular has examined statistics
to show the tremendous geographic disparity in access to SIJS. She attributes the disparities to three factors: 1) variance in child welfare policies and
14 See generally Dara Kay Cohen ct. al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the
Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 689-700 (2006).
"4 See Liebmann, supra note 110, at 588-589.
"48 USCIS

Policy Memorandum, PM-602-0050: REVISED GUIDANCE FOR iHE RF-FFRRAL

NTAs IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND REMOVABLE
ALIENS, Nov. 7, 2011, available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/
Memoranda/StatieFilcs_Memoranda/NTA%20PM%20%28Approed%20as%20final%201 17-11%29.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B8QB-5XDG.
OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF
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practices; 2) differing state laws; and 3) differing availability of legal representation for the minors. Experienced SIJ attorneys Megan Johnson and Yasmin Yevan hone in on particular statutory differences, such as the age-limit
for state court jurisdiction over minors, as well as case law differences, such
as how courts view one-parent SIJ cases (that is, cases where the child can
be cared for by one parent, but was abused, abandoned, neglected or other
by the other parent). 49 Professor Hlass's research reveals important ways the
state process can be improved (for example, requiring better screening for
immigrant children in child welfare programs, and increasing rates of representation). She also calls for a federal safeguard for minors whose cases fall
through the cracks for whatever reason-a suggestion that would surely help
address some of the problems with the state role. As this section reveals,
however, a federal safeguard would not address other problems emerging
from the patchwork, complex system of state-level involvement in the federal immigration role.
a.

Geographically Disparate Results

Johnson and Yevan's case study of Nebraska shows just how increasingly states are getting involved in developing federal immigration law.
They tell the story of Erick M., whose father had abandoned him, but whose
mother maintained an active, supportive role. While the plain language of
the 2008 version of the SIJ statute permits the state court to make the requisite findings when the abuse, abandonment, neglect or other stipulation is by
one or both parents (emphasis added), the state argued that this interpretation "rendered the 'or both' superfluous, thus making the statute ambiguous.
The Nebraska Supreme Court found the language ambiguous, and turned to
the legislative history, and then to its interpretation of what USCIS guidance
there was. The court found only two two-parent cases for reference, concluding that one-parent abandonment was insufficient to establish SIJ eligibility.
In re Erick M stands as good law in Nebraska, despite abundant decisions
from USCIS granting SIJS where there was one parent with whom the minor
could be reunited.
The important point here is not whether this was a good or bad result.
Rather, what matters is that it was a state-driven outcome in the implementation of a federal law. This raises two problems. First, while Congress delegated authority to the states to make traditional juvenile court kinds of
findings, the statute did not delegate authority to interpret the Immigration
and Nationality Act itself. Second, the case shows the real disparities that
could arise across states. A minor in Erick's position in California would
149Megan Johnson and Yasmin Yevan, Uneven Access to Special Immigration Juvenile
Status: How the Nebraska Supreme Court Became an Immigration Gatekeeper, 33 CHILD L.
RIGHTS J. 64, 77-78 (2013); see also Heryka Knoespel, Note: Special Immigrant Juvenile Sta

tus: A "Juvenile" Here Is Not a "Juvenile" There, 19 WASH. & LFE J. CIvlL RTS. & SOC. JUST.

505 (2013) (focusing on tho variation on ago out provisions for minors seeking to be under the
jurisdiction of state courts).
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have access to SIJS: Eddie E. v. Superior Court specifically criticizes In re
Erick M. for finding the word "or" to be ambiguous.' 0 While that is certainly good news for minors seeking SIJS in California, the California court
still engaged in statutory interpretation 51 of an immigration law in ways that
made it a gatekeeper, just as Nebraska did. Being a more generous gatekeeper does not extinguish the problematic nature of the gatekeeping role at
the state-level.
Documenting this disparity-and especially its sources-is the subject
of Professor Hlass' important recent article. Among its many findings, she
notes a state's level of SIUS application does not correlate to the percentage
of a state's undocumented population, presumably a reasonable, if rough,
52
guidepost for how many SIJS cases one would expect to see in a state.
Thus, Nevada, which has the 13th highest undocumented population, ranks
30th for SIJ applications-proportionately under-represented in SIJ applications-while Michigan is 18th for its undocumented population, and yet
ranks 8th for SIJ applications. 53 Professor Hlass interviewed Ken Borelli,
the child welfare worker who inspired the original passage of SITS. She
writes, "Mr. Borelli calls the implementation of SITS a 'tragedy,' as there is
4
absolutely no consistency in implementation across the country."''These state-level disparities also mask the profound disparities within
states, from county to county, as some counties develop robust procedures
for identifying and processing potential SITS cases, and other counties refuse
to engage whatsoever. 5" This is in line with other sub-state disparities that
56
have arisen in the context of immigrant rights in the past decade.
As a momentary aside to which the article will return in the conclusion,
it is vital to note that, currently, the disparity across state courts is mirrored
in disparities at the final stage of the process federally. Once the immigration
petitions are approved, the children apply to adjust status to lawful permanent residence. This "adjustment" adjudication has primarily happened at
USCIS district offices around the country, and those district offices also produced widely disparate outcomes-which explains my recommendation for
centralization of the SITS function in one place within USCIS, as is done
with the VAWA Unit. As of 2015, USCIS announced that it would, in future,
150Eddie E. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App. 4th 319, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773 (2015).
'1 The California court relied on the statute' plain language to reach its result and while
for many SIJS advocates, the plain language is hardly a subject that needs interpretation,
"plain language" is nonetheless a tool of statutory interpretation-and the contrary Nebraska
result shows this is a matter of at least some ambiguity.
152Id. at 297 (Figure 8).

153Id.

154Id. at 300.

"' "The [U.S. Committee for Refugee and Immigrant Children] has mentioned that a few
juvenile court judges in New Jersey and northern Florida have refused to adjudicate a child
dependent who otherwise appeared eligible for dependency because the judge assumed that the
child would later seek immigration relief." Adelson, supra note 42, at 81.
56 See Pulitzer, supra note 10; NYUICP Report, supra note 98. For a case study of other
intra-state disparities, see Elizabeth Keyes, Examining Maryland's Views on Immigrants and
Immigration, 43 U. BAI:r. L.F. 1 (2012).
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centralize adjudications of SUS applications as well, recognizing the problem of disparities across offices.
b.

Thought-Experiment: SIJS as an Experiment in State-Level
Involvement in Granting Immigration Status

It is worth pausing to consider the argument that perhaps there is value
to more state-level involvement in the benefits-side of immigration, such as
we see with SIJS. As I have written elsewhere,' 57 states currently bear a
significant portion of enforcement responsibility for immigration, with no
commensurate ability to provide the benefits of immigration, which creates
enormous problems at the state level. States that are effectively and generously implementing SIJS are certainly permitting more state residents to
gain lawful status in ways that are of tremendous benefit not only to the
immigrants themselves, but also to the states: immigrants with permanent
residence can avail of federal loans for education, leading to better and more
regular employment, and other kinds of benefits long-documented in policy
debates concerning immigration reform itself.15 s
SIJS-friendly states hence provide a counter-example to the norm of
states being uninvolved on the benefits-side of immigration, and show the
possibilities-purely hypothetical under all major existing immigration doctrine-of what states might do, if constitutionally permitted, to provide reasonable, effective paths to citizenship for immigrant residents, or develop
innovative systems for attracting future migrants, and so forth. Per Professor
Hlass's study, immigrant minors in states like New York, Massachusetts,
Michigan and California are benefiting tremendously from having robust access to SIJS, through a combination of good laws and child welfare policies,
and access to representation. More still, it arguably shows how other immigrants in such states might similarly benefit if this quirky state role were not
limited to SIJS.
There is, of course, a flip side to this trend. The question remains of
what would happen in states where immigrants have not been welcomed,
and how limited the options would be in such states. As well studied
throughout and beyond legal scholarship, 5 9 when the rights of minorities
See Keyes, supra note 156.
See, e.g., The White House, The DREAM Act: Goodfor our Economy, Good Jbr our
Security, Good for our Nation, available athttps://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/
DREAM-Act-WhiteHouse-FactSheet.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UBM4-ZDA6 ("According to a recent UCLA study, students that would be impacted by the DREAM Act could add
between $1.4 to $3.6 trillion in taxable income to our economy over the course of careers,
depending on how many ultimately gain legal status."); Immigration Policy Center, Economic
Benefits of Granting DeferredAction to UnauthorizedImmigrants Brought As Youth (June 22,
2012), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/economic-benefits-grantingdeferred- action-unauthorized-immigrants-brought-us-youth, archived at http://perma.cc/
YEM7-JFRB.
159 See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2074 (2013) (examining the impact of subfederal
regulation of immigrants).
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like immigrants are concerned, protection of those rights is best, if imperfectly, served under federal law. And the disparities Professor Hass has documented show that while some states do very well with SIJS adjudications,
in others, the combination of laws, less-developed child welfare systems,
and lack of resources hinder access. Although it is absolutely impossible to
predict even loosely what state-level immigration laws and systems might
look like, what is possible to predict is that lack of resources, anti-immigrant
animus, or perhaps a combination of the two, would lead to some states
being significantly less welcoming than others. Perhaps that merely codifies
a de facto defederalization that encourages or discourages immigrant residents through pro- or anti-immigrant state and municipal laws. But the
constitutional problems this creates (everything from issues of full faith and
credit to rights of travel across states) are gargantuan. Any revisiting of the
federal role in immigration should be undertaken intentionally, and not inadvertently through provisions of immigration law like the state role in SJS.
B.

Adversarial Versus Non-Adversarial Proceedings

SIJS cases, as already noted, occur in both the dependency/child welfare setting, and other state court settings like guardianship and custody proceedings. This divide, expectedly, provides the source of another set of
disparities. Randi Mandelbaum and Elissa Steglich present the problem as
follows: "Often children who lived through very similar abuse or neglect
circumstances will have very different immigration outcomes depending on
whether they were found to be in need of state care, as compared to those
outside the system (residing with a relative caregiver, homeless, or simply
unable to access the child welfare system)."'16 They tell the story of a young
woman, Jessica, who suffered a clear case of abuse, was unable to be reunited with either parents, and was better off in the United States. Yet, they
continue,
[A] huge question will remain for Jessica as to whether she can
meet the fourth threshold criterion, which requires that she be 'declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or
whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the
custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or
entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United
States.' Stated differently, it is unclear whether Jessica will ever be
able to trigger the jurisdiction of a state court, despite the obvious
fact that she is an abused child in need of the state's attention.' 6'

"6Randi Mandelbaum & Elissa Steglich, Disparate Outcomes: The Quest for Uniform
Treatment of Immigrant Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 606 (2012). Professor Hass notes that the
foster care context has worked well in jurisdictions that have good screening mechanisms in
place for SIJS children, but that screening policies vary widely. See Hlass, supra note 10.
161Id. at 609.
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The case Mandelbaum and Steglich describe is not rare. Many children are
not already in dependency proceedings; only those who were detected at
entry, transferred to ORR custody, and for whom no suitable guardian was
found are in those proceedings, or children who came into dependency proceedings through abuse or neglect issues that arose while in the United
States. A child who successfully entered the country without detection
would not be placed in ORR custody, which might be a path to the dependency proceedings that would help them qualify for SIJS. Likewise, a child
who was detected but placed in ORR custody and released to a suitable
relative is not on a path to SIUS through dependency proceedings.
Even if the minor is able to access state court without a dependency
case, the manner in which dependency and non-dependency cases are conducted differs significantly as well. In the dependency setting, the minor is
already in some way involved in the court system. The judge, the welfare
agency, the guardian for the minor and, if there is counsel, the immigration
lawyer, all share the same goal, which speeds resolution of the process and
allows SIUS to move forward with reasonable speed. In adversarial custody
or guardianship proceedings, the opposite is true-the court, properly, needs
to be concerned with the rights of both parents, which are often at odds with
the rights of the child.
The need for an adversary in custodial or guardianship proceedings creates its own issues, from inefficiencies to the emotional costs when cases
demand a compromise of minor clients' dignity. Other cases from the University of Baltimore clinic, for example, have steadily illustrated these issues.' 62 In one, a grandparent with no guardianship or custody order had
trouble accessing medical benefits for the grandchildren. They went to state
court to get the order, and also asked for the SIJ predicate order. The grandparent first needed to terminate the children's mother's rights (the minor's
father had been killed) before seeking guardianship. This required an attorney delving into advanced family law matters, and delaying the case many
months as the grandparent attempted to serve a mother who had disappeared
years earlier. Had the children been able to apply directly to USCIS, the
attorney could have assembled all the evidence of abandonment through affidavits and other corroborating evidence. This could have been developed
in a fraction of the time required for the court to work through all the periods
of time for service, deciding motions for alternative service and so forth. In
both cases, the same evidence is ultimately presented-while the USCIS
option would not allow another party to submit contrary evidence in state
court with missing parties and default orders, only the plaintiff or petitioner's
evidence is presented anyway.
In another custody case for two brothers who lived with their father, the
clerk demanded that the boys' deceased mother be named on the papers as an
adversary. Naming the mother this was extremely difficult for the boys to
accept, and showed the cost to client dignity. The dignitary value of a client's
162The stories have been blended to help conceal the identity of the clients.
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narrative has been well articulated elsewhere, 163 and is a value that the Clinic
shares. Yet the demands of the forum required this as a tactical matter. The
entire situation showed a square peg trying to fit in to a round hole, simply
to pass through the filing protocols. While such dignitary issues might
emerge in any family law proceeding, they would not have arisen had the
boys been able to apply directly to USCIS where no adversary is needed.
Finally, the adversarial setting requires service of process. Service issues alone add considerable delay and expense to proceedings, since there is
no general equivalent to a process server in the countries where these children are from. Even if it were easy to find a process server, any addresses for
a parent or parents may be extremely old or non-existent since many of the
minors have not had contact with a parent since infancy, if ever. Even where
the parent's location is known, it may be extremely rural, with no postal
address. Service would hence depend upon the willingness of a relative to
undertake sometimes arduous travel to deliver the documents. Some jurisdictions understand this, and will rule quickly on motions for alternate service, even before the initial (likely-futile) service attempt is made-or will
undertake a pendente lite proceeding to get a predicate order in place while
awaiting service. But in other jurisdictions, attorneys must make the service
effort, then file a motion for alternative service, and then effectuate the alternative service. This process takes money and attorney time, and extends the
timeline of these cases, while also frustrating the immigration courts that are
trying to move the cases along with reasonable speed. Where states are terminating parental rights, the Hague Convention may be triggered, resulting
in further complexity of the state adjudication. Due process demands all of
this, and rightly so, because parental rights are at issue. But this constitutes a
significant downside of needing to process SIJS cases through forums where
parental rights are at issue.
Furthermore, when procedural requirements are ultimately met, the
substantive treatment of these cases can also be poor. While many judges
know the SUS statute and apply the law effectively, others either refuse to
consider SIJS cases at all (during the writing of this article, Loudon County
in Virginia, which has a roughly 20% foreign-born population, became another such jurisdiction), refuse to consider one-parent SIJS cases (Nebraska,
as noted above, and a county in Tennessee), or apply standards more typical
of contested custody proceedings. For example, courts may be disinclined to
hear the testimony of children witnesses, lest it work against the court's family preservation mission. Similarly, they may be hesitant to terminate another parent's rights in the absence of the overseas parent.
One attorney shared this experience with me, writing that "In the transcript, as well as in the order, she acknowledges that the [minor] and his
father's testimony is consistent and uncontested. However, the judge doesn't
like the idea of making findings of abuse, neglect or abandonment without
163Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14

GEo. J. LEAL ETHics 1 (2000).

Harvard Latino Law Review

Vol. 19

the mother's testimony."1 4 The same judge voiced her opinion that both father and son had a strong incentive to fabricate a story for immigration. purposes, which is an example of another source of poor judicial outcomes in
state courts: judges may fear how immigration law muddles their mission.
Megan Johnson and Yasmin Yevan have written that "local officials are
often wary of the implications of their actions and nervous about what they
perceive as making decisions about whether a person will obtain an immigration benefit. Some may not want to participate in what they perceive as a
process that condones or further encourages illegal immigration."165 While
many family judges embrace SIJS claims, access to the federal protection
should not depend upon the good fortune of landing in such a judge's courtroom or living in a particularly SIJS-friendly county.
C.

The Catch-22 of Using State Court Primarilyfor SIJS Purposes

Since 2004, if not before, immigration authorities have examined
whether the minor is in court only for purposes of seeking the predicate
order to apply for SIJS. In a memo interpreting the 1997 SIJS statute, Associate Director for USCIS Operations William Yates says that adjudicators
must look for an application to be bona fide before providing express consent to the SIJ petition. Citing the conference report accompanying the 1997
law, but not the statute itself, Yates writes that a petition is bona fide if the
adjudicator determines: "that neither the dependency order nor the administrative or judicial determination of the alien's best interest was sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from
' 66
abuse or neglect [or abandonment.]"'
For many potential SIJS petitioners, this additional determination is not
problematic. Immigrant minors in the state foster care system, for example,
would meet this requirement because a state court had deemed that no parents or other suitable relatives were able to take care of them-whether or
not they actually sought SITS status, their case was before the state court,
and the immigration benefit was not the reason for the immigrant being entangled with state court in the first place.
For many others, they are seeking the dependence order for both reasons: to pursue permanent residence and to obtain relief from abuse or neglect. This is relief that comes best with permanent residence, which
dramatically reduces the risk of the minor being sent back into harm's way in
the country of origin. These two motivations are almost impossible to disentangle. However, it is possible for the government to say that when SIJS'
expanded beyond its original context, a sub-section of newly eligible minors
were going to state court primarily for access to the immigration benefit-

This correspondence is on file with the author.
Johnson and Yevan, supra note 149.
166Yates, supra note 68.
'6
165

Spring 2016

Evolving Contours of Immigration Federalism

81

and to deny the petition on that basis (again, problematically looking behind
the state court findings to do so). Generally, when one parent dies, the other
parent has custody by default. Because SIUS requires the predicate order,
however, the parent does need the custody proceeding, without which there
is simply no vehicle to get the predicate order required for the immigration
benefit. Likewise, where one parent abandoned the child before or shortly
after the child's birth, and had not been heard from since, the remaining
parent would have little need for a formal custody order, since no one was
contesting legal or physical custody. 67
Per this interpretation, a child who has been abused, abandoned or neglected by one or both parents, who is in the jurisdiction of an appropriate
state entity, and whose best interests would not be served by returning to the
country of origin-i.e. a child who meets the definition stated in INA
101(a)(27)(J)-cannot apply for SIJS if the primary reason for availing of
the state proceeding is to acquire the predicate order. This is a significant
Catch-22: the only way to apply for the status is through the state. This
consent function, then, which emerged as a way for the federal government
to reclaim its control over gatekeeping for these cases, actually complicated
effective implementation of the statute's protective function.
The contention of this article is that as the state court role has shifted
from something it has traditionally done (custody and foster care placement)
to something it has not traditionally done (the first-phase of an immigration
benefit adjudication) the federalism issues and geographic disparities reveal
a troubling new phenomenon. This is not immigration as incident to a traditional state role, but rather a state role in the purveyance of immigration
benefits. Notably, state criminal courts play a comparable role on the enforcement side, but their judgments are held to a federal standard (through
the categorical and modified categorical approaches) that limit the extent to
1
which the federal government is governed by the state criminal judgments. 68
That is not the case here. No federal standard helps state courts reach a
determination on the issues of abandonment, abuse, neglect and similar
issues.
D. Access to Justice
a.

Limited Access to Legal Representation

Another significant problem resulting from the state-role in SIUS is the
way in which the complex process limits access to justice for prospective
167Fortunately

for parents in such situations, there are other reasons to go to state court,

such as complying with passport issuance requirements that demand both parents' signatures or
a formal finding of legal custody, or as in one case I handled, the simple ease of presenting a
familiar document to the minors' schools, health care providem, insurance companies and so
forth.
"' See generally, MARY KRAMER, THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTONS (6th ed. 2015).
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beneficiaries of the law. These minor children, or their would-be guardians
or custodians, must retain a lawyer who is competent in at least two areas:
affirmative immigration applications and state court custody, and guardianship or child welfare cases. Immigration law is famously opaque and difficult to practice, and the custody and guardianship proceedings of family law
require an additional set of skills that are best obtained through specialized
training, immersion in the culture of particular state courts, and strong networks within the family law bar.169 Most likely, the attorney also needs to be
competent at removal defense, since so many of the unaccompanied minors
are already in removal proceedings. Each of these three areas requires a
plethora of detailed, and often court-specific, knowledge.
A non-exhaustive list of competencies for a lawyer engaging in typical
SIJS representation would include:
• Interviewing and counseling traumatized children
* Understanding the ethics of representing minors and/or the ethics
surrounding joint representation of the minor and the prospective
custodian/guardian (conflict of interest issues, in particular)
* Fluency in Spanish or expertise working with interpreters
• Familiarity with immigration court rules, and understanding of how
specific immigration judges run their courtrooms
* Ability to assess the sufficiency of immigration charging documents
• Understanding of other potential avenues of relief including asylum
(usually complex in its own right for these minors)
* Knowledge of FOIA and ORR processes for obtaining complete
records of the children from the point at which they first crossed the
border
• Mastery of state court service rules
" Knowledge of substantive state laws concerning custody, guardianship, and termination of parental rights
* Awareness of how different courts in different counties channel SIUS
cases, or whether those counties accept SIJS cases at all
• Knowledge of particular judges' views on SIJS and those judges' litigation styles
• Ability to work with other professionals like guardians-at-litem, social workers and psychologists.
Many excellent non-profit organizations, like KIND and Catholic Charities, provide low-cost or free direct representation and also train pro bono
169One family lawyer put forth advice in the ABA 101 Practice Series urging young lawyers not to "dabble." She writes, "The practice of family law is truly a myriad of areas of
practice ... As numerous the areas of family practice, there are also the nuances and complications that may arise in each area that can trip up even a seasoned family law attorney." Katherine L. Provost, What I Wish I Knew Starting Out in Family Law, ABA 101 PRACI-rCE SERIFS,
101 201available at http:/wv,,w.americanbar.org/groups/young-lawyers/publications/the
practice-series/things-i-wish-i-knew_starting out in familylaw.html, archived at http://per
ma.cc/UFM5-NRZE.
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attorneys, but this list of competencies explains why the available resources
have never yet been sufficient to meet the need. Some jurisdictions have
marshaled extraordinary resources to try to meet the needs, like New York
City (which benefits both from the innovative Immigrant Defense Project
and the coordinated services of organizations like Catholic Charities, KIND,
Safe Passages, as well as a strong tradition of pro bono work). But many
more struggle to make a dent in the level of need. In general, larger cities
have more such resources to draw upon, and many children are released to
relatives in or near those cities, but many go to more remote areas with far
less abundant services.'70 Those children will struggle to find a lawyer who
can meet their legal needs, and without the lawyer, the protection of SIJS is
out of reach. A simplified process that lets immigration lawyers simply be
immigration lawyers would greatly assist the effort to find representation for
the children's immigration cases.171
While this might be seen as a sacrifice of expertise and thoroughness
for the sake of efficiency and access to justice, the article posits that this is a
false dichotomy. As Section II, supra, establishes, there is at most only a
minimal sacrifice in expertise-and the extent to which it is even a sacrifice
is debatable. And to the idea that a non-adversarial process is less thorough,
the article responds that immigration applications are exceptionally thorough, as adjudicators expect to see ample corroboration and attorneys understand that they must fight against a narrative of fraud that casts doubt on the
applications. While state court filings might be quite slim, sometimes just a
dozen or so pages of one or two affidavits, birth certificates and the like,
immigration filings are very often exhaustive, containing as much corroboration as possible. This includes case-specific corroboration from witnesses,
proof of education and medical care, expert psychological evaluations, abundant evidence of country conditions, and other information.' 72 Efficiency and
,70 The FY2014 data on counties to which HHS released unaccompanied minors can be
found at Office of Refugee Resettlement, Unaccompanied Children Released to Sponsors by
County FY14, June 2, 2015, [hereinafter HHS data] available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/unaccompanied children released to cponsor-by county fy1, archived at
http://perma.cc/PW3V-CM9E. Many surround major metropolitan areas, but others are farther
afield, including Morgan County, Alabama (51 children), El Paso County, Colorado (65 children), Elkhart County, Indiana (65 children), Anne Arundel County, Maryland (210 children)
and Morris County, New Jersey (234 children). While some of these locations are within reasonable driving distance of cities with significant bilingual legal services resources, not all of
these children have caretakers who can drive, have cars, or can take a day off work each time it
ISneccssary to meet with the lawyer, which makes even the smaller distances highly signifi
cant for access to representation.
"' Professor Rogerson rightly notes that even where representation is bifurcated between
the family law piece and the immigration law piece, family lawyers may not be familiar with
the "downstream" ramifications of the state court hearing-for example, the need to avoid
including any of the parent's own transgressions (such as helping a child cross the border
illegally, or working under false papers) in testimony that could affect their immigration status
along the line. Email from Professor Rogerson, Aug. 11, 2015 (on file with author).
72 For a typical list of suggested supporting documents in an immigration case, see Immigrant Law Resource Center, Document Gathering Under the Violence Against Women Act: A
Step-By-Step Guide (2008), available at http://www.ilrc.org/files/document-gathering-for_
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thoroughness are by no means at odds in the federal, non-adversarial
process.
b.

The Cautionary Tale of Maryland: Trying Hard and Still
Struggling to Meet the Need

Maryland provides an excellent illustration of a state grappling with
this problem.'73 Some 4,000 Central American children came to Maryland in
the 2014 "surge" of child migrants-most to counties near Washington, DC
(another city with a strong tradition of pro bono lawyering), Baltimore or
Annapolis, but others farther removed from the denser legal resources of the
larger cities. 7 4 In many ways, the efforts to respond to the new needs were
commendable. From state and local governmental authorities to the private
bar to legal services providers, the response was intense. First, local organizations and bar associations quickly began coordinating their efforts, especially in regard to building pro bono capacity. Catholic Charities of the
District of Columbia (which serves the Maryland counties bordering Washington, D.C.) held a training for Maryland attorneys as early as July 1,
2014, 71 and several more occurred over the following months as the Maryland Pro Bono Resource Center came up to speed on SIJS and developed a
coordinating role among the various non-profits..Multiple organizations participated in a forum held with the Executive Office of Immigration Review
in Baltimore in August 2014, where both immigration officials and advocates agreed on the urgent need for improving rates of representation for the
children. Esperanza Center (Catholic Charities in Baltimore) organized a
massive screening event in September that recruited and trained attorneys.
KIND held regular trainings at various law firms to help develop its cadre of
pro bono attorneys. In October 2014, the Pro Bono Resource Center held a
state-wide pro bono training for hundreds of lawyers, and later received
funding to create a full-time SIJS coordinator within the Center in early
2015. And the Maryland State Bar Association's Immigration Section won
the MSBA's service award for its pro bono response to this crisis.
But their efforts were not enough. Despite this coordinated activity
from such a range of entities, too many children could not find lawyers, and
the non-profits providing most of the representation still have lengthy waiting lists as of this writing. These lists are likely to worsen as limited-time
funding for staff attorneys at those non-profits expires and positions disappear, and as new groups of children arrive. Efforts at recruiting pro bono
attorneys continue, but with the children no longer occupying the headlines,
self-petitioningunderjthe violence-against women-act.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
6GCZ-Q67B.
17' All details in this miniature case study come from the author's own experience playing
a coordinating role in these 2014 efforts, and are all documented in emails on file with the
author.
" See HHS Data, supra note 170.
'71 Catholic Charities had been holding such trainings before the surge as well, but intensified efforts to meet the new needs.
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recruitment may become more difficult. Finally, a previous experiment with
pro bono assistance for similar cases led to issues of pro bono attorney
burnout,'76 something Maryland has not yet experienced generally but should
be watchful for.
Without representation, the SIUS process is almost impossible to access.
Pro se litigants would need to know how to raise the issue of a predicate
order with the state court, assuming they were able and willing to access
state court on their own (state courts do frequently provide pro se assistance
to litigants, although it would not help with other issues, like serving disappeared foreign defendants). This is all while routinely appearing before an
immigration judge who may or may not be familiar with the state court process and resulting, often slow, timeline. All of the above is daunting without
the added issue of language access, which is mandated by law yet poorly
implemented at many levels of the legal system. A simpler process situated
uniquely within the immigration bureaucracy would-in addition to addressing the issues of geographic disparities and inappropriately adversarial settings noted above-make it easier to recruit and train attorneys for the
children, and easier for them to then find counsel to guide them through the.
process.
CONCLUSION: TIME TO CONSIDER FULLY RESTORING THE FEDERAL ROLE

Scholars have already proposed alternatives that would ameliorate
some, but not all, of the problems identified by this article, largely focusing
on ways to improve the existing state court processes,'77 or clarifying the
level of deference to state court decisions. 78 Other ideas include creating
redundant jurisdiction, so that if a child cannot avail of a state court process,
he or she can turn as a fail-safe to the federal government. Such an effort is
much like the process that currently exists for T visas, where victims must
attempt to get a law enforcement certification that they cooperated into an
investigation of human trafficking, but can show USCIS evidence of their
efforts to cooperate if law enforcement refuses to issue a certification for
them. All, though, would significantly improve the existing system, and in
the absence of full-scale reform, are extremely important to implement.
What this article has shown, however, is that at its core, this system of
sharing power between the federal and state levels for these particular immigrant children is not a cooperative system, but a tense one. Power-sharing is
contested, and this comes to the detriment of the children themselves and to
176 Then-Chief Judge Michael Creppy of the Executive Office of Immigration Review
testified before the U.S. Senate in 2002 about a pilot project in Arizona: "Now, as an example,
in Phoenix, we have the private bar there agree to take juvenile cases for pro bono. But they
did it for a number of months and they're burned out, taking one case after the other. You start
to whittle down those that have the willingness to do it." 2002 Child Protection Act Hearing,
supra note 53 (statement of Judge Creppy).
117See Hlass, supra note 10.
171See Fisher Page, supra note 72.
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the frustration of the law's own objectives. The article has also shown how
involving states adds an untenable burden for the children and for the legal
service providers who serve them, creating an access to justice crisis. The
extent of these issues demands a reexamination of the allocation of power
for protection of child migrants, and one such result would be legislative
reform making SIJS a purely federal immigration process, with a dedicated,
centralized corps of decision-makers akin to the Crime Victims Unit or the
Asylum Corps.
Such an overhaul would create its own set of issues. First, it would need
to be done with the vision of mirroring the very best of existing state law
interpretations of eligibility for SIJS, from permitting petitions through age
21 to broad understandings of "abuse, abandonment, neglect, or other similar basis." Second, lawyers who have been working with Department of
Homeland Security on other applications voice frustration with everything
from fee waivers that are unevenly implemented to requests for evidence
that seem ill-informed (or which ignore the evidence already submitted), and
it is almost certain that such frustrations would be true of SIJS adjudications
as well. Third, USCIS makes its own mistakes and has its own biases, particularly concerning the level of fraud in the system. Recent revelations of
fraud from the New York area are likely to elevate scrutiny for fraud even
farther.'79
Nonetheless, there is a remarkable and largely untold case study from
the Crime Victims Unit that suggests that this could still be done and done
well. A small, focused cadre of advocates from organizations like the National Immigration Project 0 and the National Network to End Domestic Violence Against Immigrant Women' 8' have developed effective means of
working with the USCIS unit in charge of these adjudications. This means
that many of the adjudication issues that have arisen have been improved
over time through training, advocacy, development and submission of ami' See Kirk Semple, Federal Scrutiny of a Youth Immigration Program Alarms Advocates, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/nyregion/
federal-scrutiny-of-a-youth-immigration-program-alarms-advocates.html?_r=0, archived at
http://perma.cc/8YPR-FK3L. Professor Adelson commented upon this issue almost a decade
ago, blaming fraud issues for the slow-down in adjudications: "One possible source for this
blowback is the new anti-fraud directive issued from USCIS national headquarters. Certainly
fear over a juvenile trying to game the system and receive a benefit to which they are not
lawfully entitled could inspire those in the USCIS adjudicators' seats to closely scrutinize SIJ
applications." Adelson, supra note 42, at 85.
18 Victims of Crime, including Intimate Partner Violence and Workplace Crimes, NAT'i
IMMIGR. PROJrcr OF THE NAT'L LAW. GUIlD, available at http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/victims.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/BEX8-7N92.
181 Among the Network's work, it lists two of principal interest to this article. First is
"Developing training materials and serving as faculty for training ... Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice personnel ... on the legal rights of immigrant survivors of violence." Second is "Advocating with government officials to ensure that federal,
state and local justice, benefits, social services and health care systems treat immigrant women
and children with respect and affords them all the benefits intended by Congress." About Us,
THE IMMIGRANT WOMEN NETWORK, available at http://www.immigrantwomennetwork.org/
AboutUs.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/R2BY-8TX7.
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cus briefs and so forth. With only one unit to focus on, instead of the hundreds of diverse state, county, and city courts and courtrooms of the current
system, advocates are able to monitor emerging problems, raise issues with
the people supervising the adjudicators, and continuously improve the process.182 Over time, too, attorneys for immigrants have learned best practices
that apply to their clients wherever those clients live, and can submit applications with the strongest possible chance of prevailing and acquiring the
protections their clients need. The Crime Victim Unit experience has therefore demonstrated how having a centralized decision-maker provides advocates with many advantages for developing expertise, for using their
experiences to improve the quality of the process, for training and retraining
the adjudicators in issues most relevant to the visas they are deciding, and
developing workable case law through appellate advocacy.
The original justifications for the state role were compelling, but have
dramatically changed over time. The conflicts-of-interest justification dissolved as the caretaking function for the children moved to a different federal agency in 2002. And the institutional competence justification, while
decidedly more complex, has changed significantly as well. States remain,
competent to handle SIJS adjudications, although this article has demonstrated how much that competence may be questioned with geographic disparities, ill-suited rules and processes, and uneven understanding of SIJS law
among judges across states, across jurisdictions within the states, and across
courtrooms within any given jurisdiction. This diffusion requires a diffusion
of advocacy resources as well, to increase access to SIJS county-by-county,
state-by-state. Children would, of course, have ongoing access to state courts
for family law claims and other matters. But the federal government has
established that it, too, has experience and institutional competence to undertake adjudications like those at the heart of SIJS. While undoubtedly imperfect-as are the state courts-the federal scheme is a robust alternative that
did not exist at SIJS creation in 1990.
The benefits for enhancing the protection of the children are plentiful.
Beyond removing the geographic disparities, centralized decision-making
also means that attorneys would only need to be expert in one set of decisions and the rules of one forum instead of dozens. This would, in turn,
improve the ability to recruit pro bono attorneys and to serve children in
more remote areas (still not an easy task, but one made easier by the simplified nature of the claims). With one adjudicating body (a SIJS unit
equivalent to the Crime Victims Unit) and one appellate body (the Administrative Appeals Office) providing a check on that lower unit, this centralization also helps develop the kind of feedback loop that is utterly missing
183
between state courts and the USCIS.
182 This story needs to be told, and the author intends to interview the many players in the
story over the last two decades to develop a future article on this topic.
183Professor Fisher Page has studied this in her forthcoming work. See Fisher Page, supra
note 72.
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This positive view of what a federalized process would look like will, I
hope, generate scrutiny, discussion and critique by scholars and advocates
alike, to deepen and refine what such a system could look like. These immigrant children deserve to place their hopes for safety in a system whose
structure and design best addresses its goals. Right now, we are far from
having such a system in place. As this article has shown, the children's
safety in the United States depends too much upon the arbitrariness of where
they live and their access to a limited set of lawyers competent to undertake
their representation. Indeed, their safety has been too much subjected to the
tensions between a "cooperative" state-federal system that has proved to be
far less than cooperative in practice.
It is time to consider letting the federal government implement its own
immigration law.

